Confirmation and explaining how possible

Forber, Patrick

doi:10.1016/j.shpsc.2009.12.006

Cited by 63 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…Conceptually distinct but not conflicting, these other forms of explanation can work together with channeling explanations in practice. Scientific how-possibly explanations have been described by Dray (1957), Brandon (1990), and Forber (2010), especially to make sense of evolutionary explanations such as accounts of adaptation. In contrast with what Dray calls "how-actually explanations," which provide accounts of how or why events actually do occur, how-possibly explanations explain how they might possibly occur.…”

Section: Channeling As Explanatorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Competition Theory and Channeling Explanation

Eliot¹

2011

Philosophy and Theory in Biology

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The complexity and heterogeneity of causes influencing ecology's domain challenge its capacity to generate a general theory without exceptions, raising the question of whether ecology is capable, even in principle, of achieving the sort of theoretical success enjoyed by physics. Weber has argued that competition theory built around the Competitive Exclusion Principle (especially Tilman's resource-competition model) offers an example of ecology identifying a law-like causal regularity. However, I suggest that as Weber presents it, the CEP is not yet a causal regularity. Instead, I argue that the scientific understanding in Tilman's theory takes a different form. The theory explains through a structure I call "channeling explanation" which does not depend on deduction from general laws, but rather builds on constraints and trade-offs represented in state-space. Recognizing this structure supports the more general point that ecology and other so-called special sciences can reveal novel theoretical approaches to philosophy of science when approached with openness to their uniqueness.

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Section: Channeling As Explanatorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Competition Theory and Channeling Explanation

Eliot¹

2011

Philosophy and Theory in Biology

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“…Salmon's (1989, 137) conception is similar. Forber (2010), in contrast, views how-possibly and how-actually explanation as different in kind. What Resnik refers to as how-possibly explanation is, for Forber, no more than an 4 Dray's account is sometimes thought to rely overmuch on psychology: for Dray, recall, one explains how-possibly to dispel a questioner's puzzlement at having witnessed or been told of some event.…”

Section: How-possibly Explanationmentioning

confidence: 97%

How-Possibly Explanations in (Quantum) Computer Science

Cuffaro¹

2015

Philos. of Sci.

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A primary goal of quantum computer science is to find an explanation for the fact that quantum computers are more powerful than classical computers. In this paper I argue that to answer this question is to compare algorithmic processes of various kinds, and in so doing to describe the possibility spaces associated with these processes. By doing this we explain how it is possible for one process to outperform its rival. Further, in this and similar examples little is gained in subsequently asking a how-actually question. Once one has explained how-possibly there is little left to do.Word count: 4,927.

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“…Forber, 2010, andReiner, 1993 The argument from how-possibly explanations builds on this distinction between how-actually and how-possibly explanations to put forward the following defence of LMM. Modellers are frequently unable to provide how-actually explanations of the phenomena they investigate, and rely on a menu of how-possibly explanations (see e.g.…”

Section: Argument From How-possibly Explanationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why We Cannot Learn from Minimal Models

Fumagalli

2015

Erkenn

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Philosophers of science have developed several accounts of how consideration of scientific models can prompt learning about real-world targets. In recent years, various authors advocated the thesis that consideration of so-called minimal models can prompt learning about such targets. In this paper, I draw on the philosophical literature on scientific modelling and on widely cited illustrations from economics and biology to argue that this thesis fails to withstand scrutiny. More specifically, I criticize leading proponents of such thesis for failing to explicate in virtue of what properties or features minimal models supposedly prompt learning and for substantially overstating the epistemic import of minimal models. I then examine and refute several arguments one may put forward to demonstrate that consideration of minimal models can prompt learning about real-world targets. In doing so, I illustrate the implications of my critique for the wider debate on the epistemology of scientific modelling.

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Confirmation and explaining how possible

Cited by 63 publications

References 40 publications

Competition Theory and Channeling Explanation

Competition Theory and Channeling Explanation

How-Possibly Explanations in (Quantum) Computer Science

Why We Cannot Learn from Minimal Models

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