Conflict and Competition over Multi-Issues

Osório, António

doi:10.1515/bejte-2016-0149

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 58 publications

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“…In fact much of the theoretical analysis on agenda formation highlights the role of campaign funding and its strategic use, proposing models where candidates or parties can affect the preferences of voters by modifying the salience of issues through the allocation of funds (see, e.g. Amorós and Puy, 2013; Aragonès et al, 2015; Dragu and Fan, 2016; Ash et al, 2017; Osório, 2018; Denter, 2020; Balart et al, 2022; Yamaguchi, 2022). Issue convergence or divergence can indeed result from such considerations but, as we will show, they also obtain if candidates do not face any budget constraints.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

(Not) Addressing issues in electoral campaigns

Barberà,

Gerber

2023

Journal of Theoretical Politics

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Two candidates competing for election may raise some issues for debate during the electoral campaign, while avoiding others. We present a model in which the decision to introduce an issue, or to reply to the opponent’s position on one that she raised, may change the further list of topics that end up being discussed. Candidates’ strategic decisions are driven by their appraisal of their expected vote share at the end of the campaign. Real phenomena observed during campaigns, like the convergence of the parties to address the same issues, or else their diverging choice on which ones to treat, or the relevance of issue ownership can be explained within our stark basic model. Most importantly, our analysis is based on a novel concept of equilibrium that avoids the (often arbitrary) use of predetermined protocols. This allows us to endogenously predict not only the list of topics that will be touched upon by each candidate, but also the order in which they will be addressed.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

(Not) Addressing issues in electoral campaigns

Barberà,

Gerber

2023

Journal of Theoretical Politics

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“…Another contribution of this paper is that the proposed extension can also be applied to multi-issue contests, in which different individuals distribute effort over a set of multiple and heterogeneous issues in order to maximize their winning chances (Arbatskaya and Mialon, 2010;Epstein and Hefeker, 2003;Friedman, 1958;Osório, 2017).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Group Contest Success Function: The Heterogeneous Individuals Case

Osório

2018

Int. Game Theory Rev.

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This paper extends the axiomatic characterization of the group contest success function in Münster (2009) to groups with heterogeneous individuals (e.g., individuals with different skills or different cognitive capacities). The obtained function allows for differences in terms of effort effectiveness between the group individuals and differences in terms of returns to scale at the aggregate level.

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Additive multi-effort contests

Hausken

2020

Theory Decis

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This article analyzes rent seeking with multiple additive efforts for each of two players. Impact on rent seeking occurs even when a player exerts only one effort. This contrasts with models of multiplicative efforts with impact on rent seeking only when a player exerts all its available efforts. An analytical solution is developed when the contest intensities are below one, and equal to one for one effort. Then, additional efforts causing interior solutions give players higher expected utilities and lower rent dissipation, which contrasts with earlier findings for multiplicative efforts. Players cut back on the effort with contest intensity equal to one, and exert alternative efforts instead. Accounting for solutions which have to be determined numerically, a Nash equilibrium selection method is provided. For illustration, an example with maximum two efforts for each player is provided. Equilibria are shown where both players choose both efforts, or one player withdraws from its most costly effort. Both players may collectively prefer to exclude one of their efforts, though in equilibrium, they may prefer both efforts. When all contest intensities are equal to one or larger than one, only the one most cost-effective effort is exerted, due to the logic of linear or convex production. Rent dissipation increases in the contest intensity, and is maximum when the players are equally advantaged determined by unit effort cost divided by impact.

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Conflict and Competition over Multi-Issues

Cited by 4 publications

References 58 publications

(Not) Addressing issues in electoral campaigns

(Not) Addressing issues in electoral campaigns

Group Contest Success Function: The Heterogeneous Individuals Case

Additive multi-effort contests

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