Conflict monitoring and the affective-signaling hypothesis—An integrative review

Abstract

Conflict-monitoring theory proposes that conflict between incompatible responses is registered by a dedicated monitoring system, and that this conflict signal triggers changes of attentional filters and adapts control processes according to the current task demands. Extending the conflict-monitoring theory, it has been suggested that conflict elicits a negative affective reaction, and that it is this affective signal that is monitored and then triggers control adaptation. This review article summarizes research on a potential signaling function of affect for cognitive control. First, we provide an overview of the conflict-monitoring theory, discuss neurophysiological and behavioral markers of monitoring and control adaptation, and introduce the affective-signaling hypothesis. In a second part, we review relevant studies that address the questions of (i) whether conflict elicits negative affect, (ii) whether negative affect is monitored, and (iii) whether affect modulates control. In sum, the reviewed literature supports the claim that conflict and errors trigger negative affect and provides some support for the claim that affect modulates control. However, studies on the monitoring of negative affect and the influence of phasic affect on control are ambiguous. On the basis of these findings, in a third part, we critically reassess the affective-signaling hypothesis, discuss relevant challenges to this account, and suggest future research strategies.

Shared neural representations of cognitive conflict and negative affect in the medial frontal cortex

“…domain-general avoidance learning). Still, our finding does lend credence to the idea that that cognitive control can be understood as an emotional process (Inzlicht et al, 2015), and that conflict can be registered as an aversive event (i.e., Botvinick, 2007;Dignath et al, 2020;Dreisbach & Fischer, 2015), at least in the dACC/pre-SMA. Similarly, additional analyses further show that our effect is unlikely to be driven by general differences in reaction time or task difficulty, or differences in arousal.…”

“…In other words, the dACC is thought to register "cognitive" conflict as an aversive event. In accordance with this idea, recent studies have supported the presence of a behavioral bias to avoid conflict, and have also shown that humans automatically evaluate conflict as negative (Dignath et al, 2020;Dreisbach & Fischer, 2015;Inzlicht et al, 2015).…”

Different temporal dynamics after conflicts and errors in children and adults

“…The relative higher cognitive load may have led to more monitoring for the expected conflict trials and thus more slowing. Assuming an involvement of an affective component in conflict and error monitoring, the higher cognitive load may elicit a stronger affective response in children leading to stronger slowing [53,54]. On the other hand, less developed performance adjustment skills would lead to stronger after-effects of responding (correctly or incorrectly) to a conflict trial [55].…”

Neural representations of social valence bias economic interpersonal choices

“…Alternatively, following previous work on affective priming and conflict (Dignath, Eder, Steinhauser, & Kiesel, 2020;Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013), adjectives could act as affective primes (Bush et al, 2018). Although we cannot completely rule out this possibility, previous results suggest otherwise.…”