Confronting Crime by Ourselves: Trust in Neighbors, Trust in Authorities, and Anti-Crime Organization

Abstract

In recent years, citizen-run anti-crime organizations have brought important challenges to Mexico and other Latin American countries. Under what circumstances are citizens more likely to seek out their neighbors to confront crime directly? I argue that when citizens do not trust state authorities, their perception of the trustworthiness of their community can increase their likelihood of engaging in anti-crime organization attempts. I analyze data from Mexico and find that an average citizen's perception of the trustworthiness of his/her neighbors correlates with his/her likelihood of engaging in an anti-crime organization attempt. Further, consistent with the main argument of this paper, I find this link to be stronger among those who distrust the police. These findings contribute by bringing back citizens' relation to the state as an important moderating force in society, and helping us understand when social trust can translate into controversial forms of state substitution.En los últimos años organizaciones anti-criminales han generado importantes desafíos para México y otros países latinoamericanos. ¿Bajo qué circunstancias buscan los ciudadanos unirse a su comunidad para enfrentar al crimen directamente? En este artículo propongo que, en contextos en los que los ciudadanos desconfían de sus autoridades de procuración de justicia, su confianza interpersonal se traduce en una mayor disposición a buscar defenderse directamente del crimen de forma colectiva. Para poner esta idea a prueba analizo datos de México. Encuentro que, en efecto, la confianza interpersonal se correlaciona positivamente con la probabilidad de un ciudadano promedio busque asociarse con sus vecinos para defenderse del crimen. Más aún, en línea con el argumento principal de este texto, encuentro que el vínculo entre estas dos variables es más fuerte entre quienes desconfían de la policía. Estos hallazgos contribuyen trayendo de vuelta al estado como una fuerza moderadora en la sociedad. En efecto, una fuerza que determina cuando la confianza social puede traducirse en formas controversiales de sustitución estatal.Over the last ten years, Mexico and other countries in Latin America have gone through a deep crisis of insecurity (Bisogno et al. 2014). To cope with this crisis, some individuals have reached out to their neighbors in attempts to form stable or ephemeral organizations to address their concerns about crime. 1 Although not all of these attempts have been successful, the ones that have pose a threat to the rights, lives, and livelihoods of alleged criminals, innocent bystanders, and vigilantes themselves (Bates, Greif, and Singh 2002;Hine 1998). Just months before this piece was written, for example, two surveyors working for a polling firm were confused for kidnappers and burned alive by citizens of a small town in Puebla (central Mexico). 1 In the pages that follow, I will call this type of behavior an anti-crime organization attempt.

The Politics of Vigilantism

“…First, some surveys include broad questions that overlap with the concept of vigilantism, but do not perfectly measure participation in vigilantism. For example, Zizumbo-Colunga (2019) analyzes a Mexican government survey that asked respondents, “in the previous year, did this household take joint action with its neighbors to defend itself from crime? [yes/no]” (580).…”

“…When research assistants and survey enumerators are sent into communities where vigilantism is common, local residents can quickly grow suspicious of the unknown outsiders, with catastrophic consequences. In Mexico, for example, two survey enumerators were recently burned alive when local residents mistook them for a pair of kidnappers (Zizumbo-Colunga, 2019, p. 574).…”

“…106–107). To be sure, some political scientists have written more substantively about vigilantism, notably Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974, 1976) and more recently Roessler (2005); Kirkpatrick (2008); Stan (2011); Reno (2011); LeBas (2013); Schuberth (2013); Phillips (2017); Moncada (2017); Obert and Mattiacci (2018); Smith (2015, 2019); Zizumbo-Colunga (2017, 2019); Osorio et al (2019); and Jung and Cohen (2020). But as Moncada (2017) observes, their work has not coalesced into a coherent research agenda because political scientists lack a common vocabulary to understand, measure, and study vigilantism.…”

Qualifying Violence: Visible Data, Invisible Lives in Recife, Brazil

“…Big data cannot measure this essential dimension of crime prevention. Scholars have established that a major reason why people cooperate with and approve of police is that they view them as legitimate authorities (Tyler and Fagan 2008; Tyler and Huo 2002; Zizumbo‐Colunga 2019). The police need public support and voluntary cooperation to maintain order effectively.…”

Disputes between neighbors in Mexican cities during the COVID‐19 pandemic

“…Our findings add to the literature by demonstrating that the COVID‐19 pandemic may have caused more disputes between neighbors (Ramphal et al, 2022 ; Tong et al, 2021 ; Yildirim & Arefi, 2021 ). Previous work shows that disputes with neighbors are associated with high levels of diversity of ethnicities and religions (Nieuwenhuis et al, 2013 ; Tong & Kang, 2021 ), population density (Cheshire & Fitzgerald, 2014 ; Liu et al, 2019 ; Merry, 1987 ), inequality (Cheshire et al, 2018 ; Méndez & Otero, 2017 ), aesthetics (Austin & Sanders, 2007 ; Bloch, 2020 ; Kramer, 2010 ), presence of crime (Mellgren et al, 2010 ; Skogan, 1986 ; Zahnow & Tsai, 2021 ), and quality of institutions (Terrill & Reisig, 2003 ; Tyler & Jackson, 2014 ; Zizumbo‐Colunga, 2019 ). This paper is among the first to document the impact of the COVID‐19 lockdown on disputes between neighbors using a sample of several cities within a developing country.…”