Congressional Representation of Black Interests: Recognizing the Importance of Stability

Abstract

The relationship between black constituency size and congressional support for black interests has two important attributes: magnitude and stability. Although previous research has examined the first characteristic, scant attention has been directed at the second. This article examines the relationship between district racial composition and congressional voting patterns with a particular emphasis on the stability of support across different types of votes and different types of districts. We hypothesize that, among white Democrats, the influence of black constituency size will be less stable in the South, owing in part to this region's more racially divided constituencies. Examining LCCR scores from the 101st through 103rd Congress, we find that this expectation is largely confirmed. We also find that, among Republicans, the impact of black constituency size is most stable-albeit negligible in sizein the South. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for the relative merits of "influence districts" and "majority minority" districts.

Race and Redistricting: What the Print Media Conveys to the Public about the Role of Race

“…We selected the set of newspapers from research by Hutchings, McClerking, and Charles (2004), who investigated congressional representation of Black interests, from the Lexis–Nexis database. When the Lexis–Nexis database did not include the specific newspaper Hutchings et al (2004) used, we selected a similar paper from the same state. These replacement papers (available from the authors upon request) were circulated in a similar region as the original newspaper and reached an approximately equally sized readership.…”

“…We selected the set of newspapers from research by Hutchings, McClerking, and Charles (2004), who investigated congressional representation of Black interests, from the Lexis-Nexis database. When the Lexis-Nexis database did not include the specific newspaper used, we selected a similar paper from the same state.…”

Legislative Oversight and the Substantive Representation of Black and Latino Interests in Congress

“…In addition to racial or ethnic group consciousness, district and institutional factors identified in the roll-call voting literature and legislative participation literature may be relevant to understanding why legislators decide to intervene in agency policymaking. Scholars have found that district constituents exert varying degrees of influence on legislators' roll-call voting behavior and their levels of participation in Congress (Achen 1978;Erikson 1978;Fenno 1978;Fiorina 1974;Hall 1996;Hutchings, McClerking, and Charles 2004;Jackson and King 1989;Kingdon 1989;Mayhew 1974;Miller and Stokes 1963). Specifically, researchers have found that representatives of districts where blacks and Latinos represent a significant percent of the votingage population tend to be supportive of liberal policies favoring blacks and Latinos (see, for example, Canon 1999;Hutchings, McClerking, and Charles 2004;andLublin 1997, 1999).…”

Legislating Without Constraints: The Effect of Minority Districting on Legislators' Responsiveness to Constituency Preferences

“…To the contrary, models that specify a single, linear relationship between percent minority and roll‐call voting assume, by definition, that constituency influence is stable. Notably, several scholars have departed from this approach, identifying a host of factors—including region, legislator's race and party, and nature of the vote—that alternately enhance or diminish constituency influence on legislative decision making (Hutchings 1998; Hutchings, McClerking, and Charles 2004; Whitby 1997; Whitby and Krause 2001). This research, however, has not considered minority districting among the factors that condition the behavior of legislators vis‐à‐vis their constituencies.…”

“…The threat of electoral defeat, however, is one of two mechanisms available to constituents for ensuring legislators’ responsiveness to their preferences. Constituents may also exert influence over legislators by electing like‐minded representatives, a pattern more common in ideologically homogenous districts (Erikson 1978; Fearon 1999; Hutchings, McClerking, and Charles 2004). Legislators whose own preferences mirror those of their constituents can be expected to make policy decisions consistent with district opinion.…”