Legislating Without Constraints: The Effect of Minority Districting on Legislators' Responsiveness to Constituency Preferences

Abstract

Numerous critics have charged that the practice of minority districting, by weakening the electoral incentives central to representative behavior, leads legislators to be less responsive to constituency opinion. Using data on referenda and initiative voting to estimate constituency preferences in each of California's 80 Assembly districts, I assess the correspondence between district opinion and roll call voting for legislators from majority-minority and majoritywhite districts. I show that constituency preferences can explain the voting decisions of legislators equally well across districts. Despite the low levels of competition and voter turnout found in majority-minority districts, legislators from these districts are no less responsive to the policy demands of their constituents.

Racial or Spatial Voting? The Effects of Candidate Ethnicity and Ethnic Group Endorsements in Local Elections

“…On the one hand, racial voting tends to privilege descriptive over substantive representation. While electing candidates who have a common racial/ethnic identity might lead to policy changes favored by a racial/ethnic community, no consensus exists on the value of descriptive representation or the factors that affect its likelihood (Gay ; Juenke and Shah ; Marschall, Ruhil, and Shah ). It is also plausible that substantive interests will suffer if candidates’ policy views are consistently out of step with those of voters.…”

Exploring the Impact of Reserved Seat Design on the Quality of Minority Representation

“…In contrast, other studies emphasize the indispensability of accountability mechanisms relating representatives and minorities (Cameron et al, 1996;Whitby, 2000). Furthermore, researchers suggest that group membership of representatives and the ability of minority voters to hold them accountable might interact: accountability mechanisms matter for representatives' willingness to defend minority interests, while group belonging of representatives, which could be held accountable, develops an additional impact (Broockman, 2013;Gay, 2007;Jensenius, 2012Jensenius, , 2013.…”

Redistricting: Reading Between the Lines

“…Although it may be true that more minorities hold power today due to the creation of majority-minority districts, how does this power translate into substantive results that benefit these communities (Griffin & Newman 2007)? As part of this effort, it might be useful to study the representativeconstituent relationship more closely by observing the legislative work of minority elected officials from such districts (Canon 1999, Gay 2007. This work should be linked to the broader research on the behavior and success of minority legislators in legislatures (see, e.g., Bratton & Haynie 1999).…”