Congressional Vote Options

Tarnishing Opponents, Polarizing Congress: The House Minority Party and the Construction of the Roll‐Call Record

“…This is likely to be an inexact science; recognizing that enforcing partisan unity is an activity that can cost its members at the polls, party leaders do not expect complete party unity on every vote (Carson et al 2010;Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger 2007). Instead, partisan pressure tends to be exerted selectively, exercised only when absolutely needed to win on legislation, and leaders of the majority party prefer to allow electorally vulnerable members to cast votes against the party when it benefits the member electorally (King and Zeckhauser 2003;Smith 2007). Thus, while the minority might try to force electorally marginal members of the majority party to stick with their party more often and appear more ideologically extreme, members of the majority and their leaders actively try to avoid such an outcome.…”

“…Expectations about how individual legislators' records differ between minority-and majorityrequested votes are less clear. The minority party ought to request votes in a way that makes vulnerable majority members look more extreme and more partisan; but the majority's "vote options" (King and Zeckhauser 2003) and selective use of direct pressure (Smith 2007) might help their members avoid this outcome, asking their safe members to take difficult votes while the vulnerable members are let off the hook. Similarly, the minority should try and do the same, allowing their vulnerable members to vote against the party when necessary.…”

The Impact of Presidential Campaigning for Congress on Presidential Support in the U.S. House of Representatives

“…Presidents, high‐ranking executive branch appointees, and party leaders pressure legislators on votes that are central to the president's policy priorities and reputation and when their efforts could change the outcome of a vote (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Beckmann 2008; Covington 1986; Cox and Katz 2007; Edwards 1989; Groseclose 1996; King and Zeckhauser 2003; Peterson 1990; Pfiffner 1988; Snyder 1991). Some arguments made on behalf of the president's position are based on the substance of the issue; others are based on the give and take of practical politics.…”

Uncovering Evidence of Conditional Party Government: Reassessing Majority Party Influence in Congress and State Legislatures

“…7 As our goal is to analyze majority party influence rather than to adjudicate among the various techniques--and because there is no consensus about which is best--we use several datasets, with the aim of showing that our results are robust to heterogeneous and diverse data sources: 8 6 Whereas our focus here is on substantive significance, the agendasetting results we present later are all statistically significant (difference of proportion tests) at the usual significance levels. Lopsided votes are unlikely to have been the focus of leadership efforts (King and Zeckhauser 2003). 8 A concern is that some of these estimates may be contaminated.…”