Conscious Action and Intelligence Failure

Bar‐Joseph, Uri; Levy, Jack S.

doi:10.1002/j.1538-165x.2009.tb00656.x

Cited by 17 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…In the real world, the line between "unwitting selectivity" and the deliberate marshalling of evidence to support one's case is often not clearly defined (Nickerson, 1998). Hence, it can be challenging to disentangle the cognitive MRR bias (we see what we expect to see) and motivational bias (we see what we want or need to see) factors that lead to a judgment (Bar-Joseph and Levy, 2009;Nickerson, 1998).…”

Section: Failure Casementioning

confidence: 99%

Behavioral strategy in the wild

Borchardt

Kamzabek

Lovallo

2022

MRR

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Purpose A decade after Powell et al.’s (2011) seminal article on behavioral strategy, which called for models to solve real-world problems, the authors revisit the field to ask whether behavioral strategy is coming of age. The purpose of this paper is to explain how behavioral strategy can and has been used in real-world settings. Design/methodology/approach This study presents a conceptual review with case study examples of the impact of behavioral strategy on real-world problems. Findings This study illustrates several examples where behavioral strategy debiasing has been effective. Although no causal claims can be made, with the stark contrast between the negative impact of biased strategies and the positive results emerging from debiasing techniques, this study argues that there is evidence of the benefits of a behavioral strategy mindset, and that this should be the mindset of a responsible strategic leader. Practical implications This study presents a demonstration of analytical, debate and organizational debiasing techniques and how they are being used in real-world settings, specifically military intelligence, Mergers and acquisitions deal-making, resource allocation and capital projects. Social implications Behavioral strategy has broad application in private and public sectors. It has proven practical value in various settings, for example, the application of reference class forecasting in large infrastructure projects. Originality/value A conceptual review of behavioral strategy in the wild.

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Section: Failure Casementioning

confidence: 99%

Behavioral strategy in the wild

Borchardt

Kamzabek

Lovallo

2022

MRR

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“…Studies thus far on decisions of the 1973 Yom Kippur War indicate that groupthink was the main reason for the so-called "concept" of the strategic surprise leading to the Yom Kippur War. According to Bar-Joseph and Levy (2009) the underlying assumptions of the "concept" were: 1) the Egyptians would not attack Israel before they could deal with the Israel Air Force and hurt Israel deep inside Israel, and 2) Syria would not enter the war against Israel without Egypt. The Polythink model, or polarized and decentralized group thinking presented by Mintz and his colleagues (Mintz and de Rouen, 2010, Mintz and Wayne, 2016a, 2016b argues however, that on the homogeneous-fragmented decision-making axis affiliated on one extreme with groupthink, the polar opposite also exists.…”

Section: Groupthink and Polythinkmentioning

confidence: 99%

From Groupthink to Polythink in the Yom Kippur War Decisions of 1973

Mintz

Schneiderman

2018

ERIS

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Many studies on decision-making in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 claim that a Groupthink syndrome led to the faulty assessment and processing of information prior to the Yom Kippur War.In this paper, based on official transcripts of the meetings held on the morning of October 6, 1973 in the office of then Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and in the office of then Prime Minister Golda Meir, and based on the Agranat Report (for inquiry into the 1973 war), we show that the wellknown Groupthink syndrome that characterized decision-making until the evening of October 5, 1973changed in the early morning of October 6, 1973 to a Polythink syndrome -a polarized and divided decision-making dynamic among members of the decision unit. Important theoretical insights and policy implications are derived from this case study.

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“…The issue is a classic ontological one. It has been discussed explicitly and implicitly across a range of literature, including intelligence failures (Bar-Joseph and Levy, 2009; Dahl, 2005; Gentry, 2008; Rousseau, 2006), foreign policy decision making (Astorino-Courtois, 2000; Vertzberger, 1990), stress and behaviour (Janis and Mann, 1977; Post, 2004), crisis management (Boin et al , 2005; Robb, 2007) and risk management (Bostrom and Ćirković, 2008; Bracken et al , 2008; Eriksson, 2001). We focus here briefly on debates within international relations (IR) theory, partly because they deal with cross-national warning signs but also to illustrate broader points about the lack of a universally agreed ‘hard science’ of warning signs.…”

Section: Warning Signals and Threat Perception: A Primermentioning

confidence: 99%

Why didn't they See it Coming? Warning Signs, Acceptable Risks and the Global Financial Crisis

Hindmoor

McConnell

2013

Political Studies

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In the immediate aftermath of a crisis, one of the most damning and penetrating questions asked of political leaders and senior state officials by the media, opposition parties and other actors is: 'why didn't they see it coming?' The question is often rhetorical, the implication being that warning signs were clear and should have been acted upon. In this article we identify the assumptions underpinning the 'why didn't they see it coming?' narrative as it has been expounded in relation to the global financial crisis in the UK and US. Since 2008 commentators have routinely argued that warning signals of an impending financial crisis were ignored by political elites, treasury officials and financial regulators. Such arguments are made in hindsight and we refer to them as backward mapping perspectives. In this article we advance a counter-narrative, from a forward mapping perspective, where the focus is on placing such 'failures' in the context of the time, without foreknowledge of the crisis that would happen.Accordingly, we argue that warning signals that, with the benefit of hindsight, now seem obvious, were actually ambiguous and fragmented because they were received and interpreted within a very different ideational environment.

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Conscious Action and Intelligence Failure

Cited by 17 publications

References 6 publications

Behavioral strategy in the wild

Behavioral strategy in the wild

From Groupthink to Polythink in the Yom Kippur War Decisions of 1973

Why didn't they See it Coming? Warning Signs, Acceptable Risks and the Global Financial Crisis

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