Conscious thinking and cognitive phenomenology: topics, views and future developments

Jorba, Marta; Moran, Dermot

doi:10.1080/13869795.2016.1176230

Cited by 11 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 75 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…3 For an overview of the cognitive phenomenology debate, see Bayne andMontague (2011), Breyer andGutland (2016) and Jorba and Moran (2016). 4 Within phenomenal intentionality views, it would be possible to claim that it is sensory phenomenal character that grounds thought-content determinacy; but as far as we know, nobody has defended such a prima facie implausible position.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The Linguistic Determination of Conscious Thought Contents

Vicente

Jorba

2017

Nous

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper we address the question of what determines the content of our conscious episodes of thinking, considering recent claims that phenomenal character individuates thought contents. We present one prominent way for defenders of phenomenal intentionality to develop that view and then examine ‘sensory inner speech views’, which provide an alternative way of accounting for thought‐content determinacy. We argue that such views fare well with inner speech thinking but have problems accounting for unsymbolized thinking. Within this dialectic, we present an account of the nature of unsymbolized thinking that accords with and can be seen as a continuation of the activity of inner speech, while offering a way of explaining thought‐content determinacy in terms of linguistic structures and representations.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For an overview of the cognitive phenomenology debate, see Bayne and Montague (), Breyer and Gutland () and Jorba and Moran ().…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Linguistic Determination of Conscious Thought Contents

Vicente

Jorba

2017

Nous

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Phenomenal contrast arguments (PCAs) are normally employed as arguments for arguing that a certain mental feature contributes to (the phenomenal character of) our experience or is phenomenologically manifest (Kriegel, ; Siewert, ). Such arguments play an essential role within the project of determining the admissible contents of experience (Siegel, ; Tolliver, ) as well as within the project of vindicating different kinds of sui generis phenomenologies such as cognitive phenomenology (Chudnoff, ; Jorba & Moran, ; Kriegel, ; Strawson, ). PCAs paradigmatically present subjects with two scenarios that are alike in most respects except from one (like minimal pairs in linguistics).…”

Section: Phenomenal Contrast Arguments: Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Phenomenal contrast arguments: What they achieve

Jorba

Vicente

2019

Mind & Language

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Phenomenal contrast arguments (PCAs) are normally employed as arguments showing that a certain mental feature contributes to (the phenomenal character of) experience. In this paper we examine a neglected aspect of such arguments, that is, the kind of mental episodes involved in them, and argue that this happens to be a crucial feature of the arguments. We use linguistic tools to determine the lexical aspect of verbs and verb phrases-the tests for a/telicity and for duration. We then suggest that all PCAs can show is the presence of a generic achievement-like phenomenology, especially in the cognitive domain, which contrasts with the role that PCAs are given in the literature. K E Y W O R D Sachievements, cognitive phenomenology, lexical aspect, mental events

show abstract

“…The cognitive phenomenology thesis has been sometimes associated to metacognitive feelings, after Goldman's () claim that the tip‐of‐the‐tongue phenomenon (henceforth TOT) is a clear‐cut instance of cognitive phenomenology. Some philosophers have followed Goldman and accept that the TOT phenomenon and other metacognitive feelings such as the feeling of knowing are examples of this kind of phenomenology (Dorsch, ; González‐Grandón, ; Jorba, ; Smithies, ), whereas others think that this argument needs further analysis (Bayne & Montague, ; Calabi, ; Jorba & Moran, ). Thus, this paper aims to assess Goldman's proposal in order to determine whether the TOT and other metacognitive feelings actually constitute an instance of cognitive phenomenology through a careful analysis of some empirical results concerning metacognitive feelings.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cognitive phenomenology and metacognitive feelings

Muñoz

2018

Mind & Language

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The cognitive phenomenology thesis claims that “there is something it is like” to have cognitive states such as believing, desiring, hoping, attending, and so on. In support of this idea, Goldman claimed that the tip‐of‐the‐tongue phenomenon can be considered as a clear‐cut instance of nonsensory cognitive phenomenology. This paper reviews Goldman's proposal and assesses whether the tip‐of‐the‐tongue and other metacognitive feelings actually constitute an instance of cognitive phenomenology. The paper will show that psychological data cast doubt on the idea that the tip‐of‐the‐tongue and other metacognitive feelings are clear‐cut instances of cognitive phenomenology.

show abstract

Conscious thinking and cognitive phenomenology: topics, views and future developments

Cited by 11 publications

References 75 publications

The Linguistic Determination of Conscious Thought Contents

The Linguistic Determination of Conscious Thought Contents

Phenomenal contrast arguments: What they achieve

Cognitive phenomenology and metacognitive feelings

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About