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Two main theories about metacognition are reviewed, each of which claims to provide a better explanation of this phenomenon, while discrediting the other theory as inappropriate. The paper claims that in order to do justice to the complex phenomenon of metacognition, we must distinguish two levels of this capacity-each having a different structure, a different content and a different function within the cognitive architecture. It will be shown that each of the reviewed theories has been trying to explain only one of the two levels and that, consequently, the conflict between them can be dissolved. The paper characterizes the high-level as a rationalizing level where the subject uses concepts and theories to interpret her own behavior and the low-level as a controlling level where the subject exploits epistemic feelings to adjust her cognitive activities. Finally, the paper explores three kinds of interaction between the levels.

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Collaborative remembering, in which two or more individuals cooperate to remember together, is an ordinary occurrence. Ordinary though it may be, it challenges traditional understandings of memory knowledge in terms of justified memory beliefs held within the minds of single subjects. Collaborative memory has come to be a major area of research in psychology, but it has so far not been investigated in epistemology. This chapter conducts an initial exploration of the epistemological implications of collaborative memory research, arguing that the findings of this research support a novel theory of knowledge: distributed reliabilism. The chapter also argues for broadening the concept of collaborative memory to include not only direct interactions among subjects but also more indirect, technology-supported, and -mediated interactions.