Collaborative Memory Knowledge: A Distributed Reliabilist Perspective

Michaelian, Kourken; Muñoz, Santiago Arango

doi:10.1093/oso/9780198737865.003.0013

Cited by 7 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 55 publications

(59 reference statements)

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“…Finally, to clarify the account on offer, Sect. 4 contrasts it with the alternative of distributed reliabilism (Michaelian and Arango-Muñoz 2018). By way of juxtaposing the two views, it will also become clear how the notion of collective epistemic standing can motivate the existence of epistemic group agents.…”

Section: Epistemic Collaborationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To unpack this point further, it is helpful to contrast the present view with an alternative account of collaborative knowledge. Drawing on process reliabilism, rather than virtue reliabilism, Michaelian and Arango-Muñoz (2018) have put forward distributed process reliabilism in order to account for knowledge that is specifically produced by TMSs.…”

Section: Distributed Virtue Reliabilismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Epistemic Collaborations: Distributed Cognition and Virtue Reliabilism

Palermos

2020

Erkenn

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Strong epistemic anti-individualism-i.e., the claim that knowledge can be irreducibly social-is increasingly debated within mainstream and social epistemology. Most existing approaches attempt to argue for the view on the basis of aggregative analyses, which focus on the way certain groups aggregate the epistemic attitudes of their members. Such approaches are well motivated, given that many groups to which we often ascribe group knowledge-such as juries and committees-operate in this way. Yet another way that group knowledge can be generated is on the basis of epistemic collaborations, such as scientific research teams and Transactive Memory Systems. To produce knowledge, epistemic collaborations rely heavily on the mutual interactions of their group members. This is a distinctive feature of epistemic collaborations that renders them resistant to aggregative analyses. To accommodate this kind of group knowledge, the paper combines virtue reliabilism with the hypothesis of distributed cognition in order to introduce the hybrid approach of distributed virtue reliabilism. On this view, (1) beliefs produced by epistemic collaborations entertain positive epistemic standing (i.e., they are both reliable and epistemically responsible) in virtue of the mutual interactions of their group members; (2) this positive epistemic standing is a collective property; (3) epistemic collaborations qualify as epistemic group agents; (4) collaborative knowledge is a special kind of group knowledge, motivating strong epistemic anti-individualism in a distinctive way. Keywords Group knowledge • Strong epistemic anti-individualism • The hypothesis of distributed cognition • Epistemic group agents • Distributed virtue reliabilism

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Section: Epistemic Collaborationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Distributed Virtue Reliabilismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Collaborations: Distributed Cognition and Virtue Reliabilism

Palermos

2020

Erkenn

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“…This is not to say that virtue reliabilism, the other main camp in virtue epistemology, is not relevant for better understanding the cognitive relations between epistemic agents and technologies. See, for instance, Michaelian and Arango-Muñoz (2018) for an interesting analysis of agent-artifact systems from a virtue reliabilist perspective in terms of memory.…”

Section: Epistemic Consequencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cognition and the Web: Extended, Transactive, or Scaffolded?

Heersmink

Sutton

2018

Erkenn

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In the history of external information systems, the World Wide Web presents a significant change in terms of the accessibility and amount of available information. Constant access to various kinds of online information has consequences for the way we think, act and remember. Philosophers and cognitive scientists have recently started to examine the interactions between the human mind and the Web, mainly focussing on the way online information influences our biological memory systems. In this article, we use concepts from the extended cognition and distributed cognition frameworks and from transactive memory theory to analyse the cognitive relations between humans and the Web. We first argue that while neither of these approaches neatly capture the nature of human-Web interactions, both offer useful concepts to describe aspects of such interactions. We then conceptualize relations between the Web and its users in terms of cognitive integration, arguing that most current Web applications are not deeply integrated and are better seen as a scaffold for memory and cognition. Some highly personalised applications accessed on wearable computing devices, however, may already have the capacity for deep integration. Finally, we draw out some of the epistemic implications of our cognitive analysis.

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“…The goal of virtue epistemology is to provide a framework for living an epistemically or intellectually virtuous life. It is thus a very promising approach to optimize our epistemic interactions with the Internet and other cognitive technologies (Heersmink, 2018;Michaelian & Arango-Muñoz, 2018). It can therefore provide the normative guidance that traditional extended mind theory lacks.…”

Section: Organizing and Finding Informationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Distributed learning: Educating and assessing extended cognitive systems

Heersmink

Knight

2018

Philosophical Psychology

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Extended and distributed cognition theories argue that human cognitive systems sometimes include non-biological objects. On these views, the physical supervenience base of cognitive systems is thus not the biological brain or even the embodied organism, but an organism-plusartifacts. In this paper, we provide a novel account of the implications of these views for learning, education, and assessment. We start by conceptualising how we learn to assemble extended cognitive systems by internalising cultural norms and practices. Having a better grip on how extended cognitive systems are assembled, we focus on the question: If our cognition extends, how should we educate and assess such extended cognitive systems? We suggest various ways to minimize possible negative effects of extending one's cognition and to efficiently find and organise (online) information by adopting a virtue epistemology approach. Educational and assessment implications are foregrounded, particularly in the case of Danish students' use of the Internet during exams.

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Collaborative Memory Knowledge: A Distributed Reliabilist Perspective

Cited by 7 publications

References 55 publications

Epistemic Collaborations: Distributed Cognition and Virtue Reliabilism

Epistemic Collaborations: Distributed Cognition and Virtue Reliabilism

Cognition and the Web: Extended, Transactive, or Scaffolded?

Distributed learning: Educating and assessing extended cognitive systems

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