Consciousness as Inner Sensation: Crusius and Kant

Indregard, Jonas Jervell

doi:10.3998/ergo.12405314.0005.007

Cited by 6 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…In V-Lo/Philippi 24:410, Kant explicitly connects state consciousness in clear representations with inner sense. Recently, Indregard (2018) argues that for Kant, state consciousness is inner sensation. See also Schulting (2015: 97).…”

Section: Obscure Representations and Inner Sensementioning

confidence: 99%

Kant on Inner Sensations and the Parity between Inner and Outer Sense

Liang¹

2020

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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Does inner sense, like outer sense, provide inner sensations or, in other words, a sensory manifold of its own? Advocates of the disparity thesis on inner and outer sense claim that it does not. This interpretation, which is dominant in the preexisting literature, leads to several inconsistencies when applied to Kant's doctrine of inner experience. Yet, while so, the parity thesis, which is the contrasting view, is also unable to provide a convincing interpretation of inner sensations. In this paper, I argue that this deadlock can be traced back to an inadequate understanding of inner sense shared by both sides. Drawing upon an analysis of the notion of obscure representations, I offer an alternative interpretation of inner sense with a special regard to self-affection, apprehension, and attention. From this basis, I will infer that outer sense delivers sensory content that is initially and intrinsically unaccompanied by phenomenal consciousness; inner sense contributes by endowing such content with phenomenal consciousness. Therefore, phenomenal qualities can be regarded as the sensory manifold of inner sense. This alternative interpretation solves the longstanding dispute concerning inner sensations and would further illuminate Kant's notion of inner experience.

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Section: Obscure Representations and Inner Sensementioning

confidence: 99%

Kant on Inner Sensations and the Parity between Inner and Outer Sense

Liang¹

2020

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…Analizuojant vidinio patyrimo reiškinius neįmanoma apsieiti ir be bendrųjų sąvokų -schemų. Nagrinėjant psichologinį subjektą, jo funkcionavimo 6 Kantiškoji "vaizdinio" sąvoka, kaip nurodo P. Guyer'is, žymi tiek juslinį vaizdinį kaip vienetinį, turintį tiesioginį santykį su savo objektu, tiek bendrąją sąvoką -bendrąjį vaizdinį, kuris gali būti susijęs su dau gybe objektų ir neturi tiesioginio santykio nei su vienu iš jų; su objektu sąvoka gali būti susijusi tik per juslinį vaizdinį (Guyer 2006(Guyer [2000: 40). 7 Vidinio patyrimo sferoje galime stebėti nuolatinį įvairių sąmonės būsenų srautą.…”

Section: Kognityvinė Sąmonė Išoriniame Ir Vidiniame Patyrimeunclassified

Cognitive Consciousness in Kant’s Theory of Experience

Rimkus¹

2019

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The article investigates the Kantian theory of cognitive consciousness not only as epistemological but also as psychological theory of human consciousness. Kant describes experience as a synthesis of sensible matter and conceptual form. Transcendental consciousness, producing basic conceptual instruments of cognition and acting both in the spheres of outer and inner experience, lying on the ground of this process. There is a social aspect in this theory of cognitive consciousness that Kant himself has never expressed directly: a priori concepts and principles/rules of cognition are produced and legitimated not only by separate individuals but also intersubjectively in a social community. Treating transcendental consciousness psychologically as a theory analysing mechanisms that establish individual consciousness, intellectual intuition (which is refused in Kant’s theory) needs to be introduced.

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“…BL, 24:41, Anth, 7:135. See Grüne (2009) and Indregard (2018) for and central to his account of empirical intuition: some objects affect our senses, and our empirical intuitions represent those objects, even if we do not notice those objects. Our senses can represent these objects because they are capacities for responding to certain types of objects that affect them-even (perhaps implausibly) very distant or very small objects.…”

Section: Empirical Intuitions Without Imagesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Anth, 7:154-155. I focus on outer sensation here, since the topic of inner sensations is rather complicated, and there are not many accounts of what they could be for Kant in the literature; for contrasting accounts, see Kraus (2013) and Indregard (2018). Cf.…”

Section: Images Without Empirical Intuitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Imagination and the Distinction between Image and Intuition in Kant

Tracz¹

2019

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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The role of intuition in Kant's account of experience receives perennial philosophical attention. In this essay, I present the textual case that Kant also makes extensive reference to what he terms "images" that are generated by the imagination. Beyond this, as I argue, images are fundamentally distinct from empirical and pure intuitions. Images and empirical intuitions differ in how they relate to sensation, and all images (even "pure images") actually depend on pure intuitions. Moreover, all images differ from intuitions in their structure or format. I then turn to a question that naturally arises on the resulting view: if the imagination produces images, and if images are fundamentally distinct from intuitions, then how do intuitions relate to the imagination? I outline reasons for thinking that intuitions and their essential features do not depend on the imagination at all. Though this essay does not decisively argue for this thesis, the resulting view provides a clear account of the distinction between the senses and the imagination in Kant's theory of sensibility. K ant famously argues that objects are "given to us" in intuitions and "thought" through concepts, and that both intuitions and concepts are required for "experience" (A50-51/B74-75, A92-3/B125). 1 Kant's bold claims about the opposition between intuition and concept (and between the faculties of sensibility and Contact: R. Brian Tracz

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Consciousness as Inner Sensation: Crusius and Kant

Cited by 6 publications

References 22 publications

Kant on Inner Sensations and the Parity between Inner and Outer Sense

Kant on Inner Sensations and the Parity between Inner and Outer Sense

Cognitive Consciousness in Kant’s Theory of Experience

Imagination and the Distinction between Image and Intuition in Kant

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