Conspiracy Theories and Evidential Self-Insulation

Napolitano, Marianna

doi:10.1093/oso/9780198863977.003.0005

Cited by 74 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…The value of a generalism that remained at a purely definitional register and did not eventually commit itself to any subsequent analysis or application would be unclear. Citing this omission is not a criticism of either Napolitano (2021) or Napolitano & Reuter (2021). These papers presumably represent the conceptual groundwork for this type of analysis.…”

Section: Implications Of Centering Ditsmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…We have seen that existing generalist accounts have failed to provide these arguments. 19 18 A reviewer asks whether paradigm cases are relevant to conceptual engineering projects such as Napolitano (2021) and Napolitano and Reuter (2021). I discuss these views in more detail in section V, but note that paradigm cases do play a key role in both these specific conceptual engineering projects and in such projects in general.…”

Section: Objectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They could revise their views to accommodate DITs as paradigmatic. In fact, the objection might continue, a recent generalist account that does not explicitly commit itself to (1)-( 4) is M. Giulia Napolitano's (2021) and Napolitano and Kevin Reuter's (2021). Generalism can, then, absorb the criticisms I have advanced here.…”

Section: Implications Of Centering Ditsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Rethinking conspiracy theories

Shields

2022

Synthese

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I argue that that an influential strategy for understanding conspiracy theories stands in need of radical revision. According to this approach, called 'generalism', conspiracy theories are epistemically defective by their very nature. Generalists are typically opposed by particularists, who argue that conspiracy theories should be judged case-by-case, rather than definitionally indicted. Here I take a novel approach to criticizing generalism. I introduce a distinction between 'Dominant Institution Conspiracy Theories and Theorists' and 'Non-Dominant Institution Conspiracy Theories and Theorists'. Generalists uncritically center the latter in their analysis, but I show why the former must be centered by generalists' own lights: they are the clearest representatives of their views, and they are by far the most harmful. Once we make this change in paradigm cases, however, various typical generalist theses turn out to be false or in need of radical revision. Conspiracy theories are not primarily produced by extremist ideologies, as generalists typically claim, since mainstream, purportedly non-extremist political ideologies are just as, if not more responsible for such theories. Conspiracy theories are also, we find, not the province of amateurs: they are often created and pushed by individuals widely viewed as experts, who have the backing of our most prestigious intellectual institutions. While generalists may be able to take this novel distinction and shift in paradigm cases on board, this remains to be seen. Subsequent generalist accounts that do absorb this distinction and shift will look radically different from previous incarnations of the view.Analysis of the paranoid style is, itself, back in style. In recent years, there has been an enormous increase in academic and public commentary on conspiracy theories, in particular concerning the threats they pose. Here are a few sample headlines: "Stop the Online Conspiracy Theorists Before They Break Democracy" (The Guardian); "'More Dangerous And More Widespread': Conspiracy Theories Spread Faster Than Ever" (NPR); "Conspiracy Theories are Dangerous -and Here's How to Crush Them" (The Economist).Recent philosophical accounts have aimed to show that there is indeed something epistemically deficient in the very nature of conspiracy theories. Such 'generalist' philosophical views are so called because they argue that conspiracy theories, as a class, represent beliefs that are inherently epistemically flawed (Buenting and Taylor 2010). Once 'conspiracy theories' are understood in this sense, generalists then typically make the following four claims regarding conspiracy theories and theorists:1.) Conspiracy theories are the work of amateurs. According to Quassim Cassam, "That's not a comment on their intellectual merits, but on the qualifications of the amateur sleuths and Internet detectives who push them" (2019,. This "amateurish" nature of conspiracy theories is why, by extension, they reject "officially sanctioned experts or sources of information" (96). 2.)Those wh...

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Section: Implications Of Centering Ditsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Objectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Implications Of Centering Ditsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Rethinking conspiracy theories

Shields

2022

Synthese

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“…In the Conspiracy Theory Theory arena, Napolitano (2021) takes a new and controversial standing in defining conspiracy theories as self-insulated beliefs in conspiracy theories. In her words: I maintain that conspiracy theories are not theories (or explanations) at all.…”

Section: Napolitano's Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Social psychologists (most already before Napolitano's (2021) paper was published) have widely acknowledged that belief in conspiracy theories is relatively normal (Bost et al, 2010), and not, as was formerly the dominant position, reserved for "paranoid individuals whose judgment is affected as the result of an uncommonly angry mind" (Hofstadter, 1965), or caused by "paranoia, delusional thinking, or other psychopathologies ([as was argued by] e.g., Groh, 1987;Plomin & Post, 1997)" (Sutton & Douglas, 2014: 254). In fact, various empirical scientists can be seen to move away from pejorative conceptions of 'conspiracy theory'.…”

Section: Conspiracy Theories and Interdisciplinary Fruitfulnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conspiracy Theories are Not Beliefs

Duetz

2022

Erkenn

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Napolitano (The epistemology of fake news, Oxford University Press, 2021) argues that the Minimalist Account of conspiracy theories—i.e., which defines conspiracy theories as explanations, or theories, about conspiracies—should be rejected. Instead, she proposes to define conspiracy theories as a certain kind of belief—i.e., an evidentially self-insulated belief in a conspiracy. Napolitano argues that her account should be favored over the Minimalist Account based on two considerations: ordinary language intuitions and theoretical fruitfulness. I show how Napolitano’s account fails its own purposes with respect to these two considerations and so should not be favored over the Minimalist Account. Furthermore, I propose that the Minimalist Account is the best conception of ‘conspiracy theory’ if we share Napolitano’s goal of advancing the understanding of conspiracy theories.

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Inoculating Students Against Conspiracy Theories: The Case of Covid-19

Bailin

Battersby

2022

Argumentation Library

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Posing a significant danger to society are conspiracy theories, particularly those regarding the Covid-19 pandemic. This paper argues for the crucial role of critical thinking education in ‘inoculating’ students against conspiracy theories and outlines an approach for building their defenses against these, and other, conspiracy theories. There are numerous epistemic, social, and psychological factors which play a role in the attraction of conspiracy theories and which need to be addressed in critical thinking education. Epistemic factors include myside bias, the ignorance of epistemic criteria, a lack of understanding of source credibility, and the particular epistemic traps of conspiracy theories. Social factors, including the structure of the information environment and psychological factors, including the desire for control, defensive bias, and cultural cognition also play a role. The paper describes how critical thinking education can address the epistemic shortcomings and errors which facilitate conspiracy belief and can provide students with the resources for inquiring in a rigorous and systematic way and for making reasoned judgment. It also outlines how the social and psychological factors can be addressed by creating a community of inquiry in the class that can counter these influences and foster a spirit of inquiry.

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Conspiracy Theories and Evidential Self-Insulation

Cited by 74 publications

References 41 publications

Rethinking conspiracy theories

Rethinking conspiracy theories

Conspiracy Theories are Not Beliefs

Inoculating Students Against Conspiracy Theories: The Case of Covid-19

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