Conspiracy theories as quasi-religious mentality: an integrated account from cognitive science, social representations theory, and frame theory

Abstract

Conspiracy theories (CTs) can take many forms and vary widely in popularity, the intensity with which they are believed and their effects on individual and collective behavior. An integrated account of CTs thus needs to explain how they come to appeal to potential believers, how they spread from one person to the next via communication, and how they motivate collective action. We summarize these aspects under the labels of stick, spread, and action. We propose the quasi-religious hypothesis for CTs: drawing on cognitive science of religion, social representations theory, and frame theory. We use cognitive science of religion to describe the main features of the content of CTs that explain how they come to stick: CTs are quasi-religious representations in that their contents, forms and functions parallel those found in beliefs of institutionalized religions. However, CTs are quasi-religious in that CTs and the communities that support them, lack many of the institutional features of organized religions. We use social representations theory to explain how CTs spread as devices for making sense of sudden events that threaten existing worldviews. CTs allow laypersons to interpret such events by relating them to common sense, thereby defusing some of the anxiety that those events generate. We use frame theory to explain how some, but not all CTs mobilize collective counter-conspiratorial action by identifying a target and by proposing credible and concrete rationales for action. We specify our integrated account in 13 propositions.

Storytelling as Adaptive Collective Sensemaking

“…Demonstrating that storytelling is an adaptation is complicated by the fact that what counts as a “story” or “storytelling” varies widely. A staggering wealth of human knowledge gets expressed in narrative form, including gossip (Dunbar, ), rumors (e.g., Guerin & Miyazaki, ), urban legends (Bangerter & Heath, ; Stubbersfield et al., ; Zipes, ), traditional legends (Dégh, ), conspiracy theories (Franks, Bangerter, & Bauer, ), myths (Lévi‐Strauss, ), personal life events (McAdams & Guo, ), and even scientific facts (Dahlstrom, ). The functions of these different discursive products may vary; thus, claiming a singly overarching function risks being excessively reductive.…”

“…At no time are collective sensemaking processes more evident than in the wake of sudden catastrophic events that threaten existing worldviews (e.g., disease outbreaks, natural disasters, outgroup aggressions) as well as survival (Proulx et al., ; Rosnow, ; Wagner et al., ). This is when people most need symbolic protection, because several conflicting explanations coexist to create a climate of fear and uncertainty (Franks et al., ). Various forms of storytelling emerge spontaneously in such situations.…”

Scientific and non-scientific information in the uptake of health information: The case of Ebola

“…They express fears and suspicion and counter official explanations by bringing together seemingly unrelated issues or errant data in common sense to interpret events. 22,23 Wagner and Hayes 24 argue that it is not the historical truths of past events, compressed in images and metaphors, that make them useful in everyday discourse, but their symbolic truth in dealing with everyday issues. Rumours and conspiracy theories proffer reasons for the public to reject a Western explanation on the origin of disease and have in the past ignited public revolts in health controversies.…”

Attributing and Managing the Crisis: Lay Representations in Three European Countries

“…As observed by Knight (2013), the severe economic situation and the harsh austerity measures that changed dramatically the everyday life of Greek citizens may have produced the idea that there is a conspiracy plan against them. This might have diffuse the anxiety of the event in the population (Franks, Bangerter & Bauer, 2013), thus contributing to the increase of a conspiracy belief that may have served as meaning making in a threatening situation (van Prooijen, Krouwel & Pollet, 2015). Further research, perhaps of qualitative nature, may be able to clarify these differences amongst countries.…”