Conspiracy theories (CTs) can take many forms and vary widely in popularity, the intensity with which they are believed and their effects on individual and collective behavior. An integrated account of CTs thus needs to explain how they come to appeal to potential believers, how they spread from one person to the next via communication, and how they motivate collective action. We summarize these aspects under the labels of stick, spread, and action. We propose the quasi-religious hypothesis for CTs: drawing on cognitive science of religion, social representations theory, and frame theory. We use cognitive science of religion to describe the main features of the content of CTs that explain how they come to stick: CTs are quasi-religious representations in that their contents, forms and functions parallel those found in beliefs of institutionalized religions. However, CTs are quasi-religious in that CTs and the communities that support them, lack many of the institutional features of organized religions. We use social representations theory to explain how CTs spread as devices for making sense of sudden events that threaten existing worldviews. CTs allow laypersons to interpret such events by relating them to common sense, thereby defusing some of the anxiety that those events generate. We use frame theory to explain how some, but not all CTs mobilize collective counter-conspiratorial action by identifying a target and by proposing credible and concrete rationales for action. We specify our integrated account in 13 propositions.

Conspiracy theories (CTs) are widespread ways by which people make sense of unsettling or disturbing cultural events. Belief in CTs is often connected to problematic consequences, such as decreased engagement with conventional political action or even political extremism, so understanding the psychological and social qualities of CT belief is important. CTs have often been understood to be “monological,” displaying the tendency for belief in one conspiracy theory to be correlated with belief in (many) others. Explanations of monologicality invoke a nomothetical or “closed” mindset whereby mutually supporting beliefs based on mistrust of official explanations are used to interpret public events as conspiracies, independent of the facts about those events (which they may ignore or deny). But research on monologicality offers little discussion of the content of monological beliefs and reasoning from the standpoint of the CT believers. This is due in part to the “access problem”: CT believers are averse to being researched because they often distrust researchers and what they appear to represent. Using several strategies to address the access problem we were able to engage CT believers in semi-structured interviews, combining their results with analysis of media documents and field observations to reconstruct a conspiracy worldview – a set of symbolic resources drawn on by CT believers about important dimensions of ontology, epistemology, and human agency. The worldview is structured around six main dimensions: the nature of reality, the self, the outgroup, the ingroup, relevant social and political action, and possible future change. We also describe an ascending typology of five types of CT believers, which vary according to their positions on each of these dimensions. Our findings converge with prior explorations of CT beliefs but also revealed novel aspects: A sense of community among CT believers, a highly differentiated representation of the outgroup, a personal journey of conversion, variegated kinds of political action, and optimistic belief in future change. These findings are at odds with the typical image of monological CT believers as paranoid, cynical, anomic and irrational. For many, the CT worldview may rather constitute the ideological underpinning of a nascent pre-figurative social movement.

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Sabine (2017) Increasing water intake in pre-school children with unhealthy drinking habits: a year-long controlled longitudinal field experiment assessing the impact of information, water affordance, and social regulation. Appetite, 116 . pp. 205-214. ISSN 0195-6663 DOI: 10.1016/j.appet.2017 Reuse of this item is permitted through licensing under the Creative Commons: Changing Children's Water Intake 1 Franks, B., Lahlou, S., Bottin, J. H., Guelinckx, I., & Boesen-Mariani, S. (2017). Increasing water intake in pre-school children with unhealthy drinking habits: a year-long controlled longitudinal field experiment assessing the impact of information, water affordance, and social regulation. Appetite, (116), 205-214. Increasing water intake in pre-school children with unhealthy drinking habits: a year-long controlled longitudinal field experiment assessing the impact of information, water affordance, and social regulation or no further intervention (-SOCIAL). Intake of plain water and all other fluid types of the children were recorded by the carers 6 times over a year using an online 7-day fluid-specific dietary record.Results: Over 1 year, all groups significantly increased water consumption by 3.0 to 7.8 times (+118 to +222 mL). INFO+W+SOCIAL and INFO-SOCIAL generated the highest increase in plain water intake after one year compared to baseline, by 7.8 times (+216 mL) and 6.7 times (+222 mL) respectively; both significantly exceeded the CONTROL (3.0 times, +118 mL), whilst the effect of INFO+W-SOCIAL (5.0 times, +158 mL) and INFO+SOCIAL (5.3 times, +198 mL) did not differ from Changing Children's Water Intake 2 that of CONTROL. All groups saw a decrease of sweetened beverages intake, again with INFO+W+SOCIAL generating the largest decrease (-27%; -172 mL). No changes in other fluids or total fluid intake were observed.Conclusions: Sustainable increased water consumption can be achieved in children with unhealthy drinking habits by influencing representations, changing material affordances, and providing social regulation. Combining the three provided the strongest effect as predicted by Installation Theory.

In this paper we demonstrate that societal psychology makes a unique contribution to the study of change through its focus on the 'contextual politics' of change, examining the different interests at stake within any social context. Societal psychology explores the contexts which promote or inhibit social and societal change and can be seen as a bridge between social and political psychology. It focuses on how the context shapes the ways in which societal change is understood, supported or resisted. To understand the intellectual rationale of societal psychology, and how it aims to foster societal change, we first consider the history of the discipline. Second, we consider what is meant by 'context', as understanding the environment of change is the hallmark of societal psychology. Third, we lay out three distinct features of a societal psychological approach to change: the politics of change; interventions and planned change; emergent change processes. Finally, the paper examines possible future developments of societal psychology and its role in understanding and creating societal change, alongside its place within the wider canon of social and political psychology.