Constitutional Change in Federations—A Framework for Analysis

Benz, Arthur; Colino, César

doi:10.1080/13597566.2011.578886

Cited by 40 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 53 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…For example, Behnke and Benz (2009) make an important distinction between the informal evolution of federal systems and more formal constitutional reform, a distinction refined further by Fenna (2012), who argues that evolution or adaptation often precedes and precipitates more formal constitutional reform in federal systems. Similarly, Benz and Colino (2011) describe four distinctive types of change (reform, innovation, evolution and adjustment) yet retain the key distinction between formal/intentional change and more pragmatic forms of adjustment.…”

Section: New Institutionalism and Federalism Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fiscal federalism in the twenty-first century

Eccleston

Krever

Smith

2017

The Future of Federalism

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: New Institutionalism and Federalism Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fiscal federalism in the twenty-first century

Eccleston

Krever

Smith

2017

The Future of Federalism

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…For instance, looking quantitatively into a single aspect, Ginsburg and Versteeg (2014) explore the adoption of constitutional review. Or, further literature on the origin or reform of federalism (e.g., Benz & Colino 2011;Burgess 2006;Elazar 1987;Erk 2007;Hooghe et al 2010;Ricker 1964;Simeon 2009) could potentially supplement the models proposed. 8.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conflict, choice or geography? Explaining patterns of democracy in continental Europe

Bernauer

Vatter

2016

European J Political Res

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The ‘character’ of democracy is regularly summarised using political‐institutional measures of, for instance, ‘consensus’ or ‘majoritarian’ democracy. Yet, there is little quantitative‐comparative research on the origins of such configurations. Drawing on literature on endogenous institutions and constitutional design, this article proposes a model for the explanation of empirical patterns of democracy. Using a novel database of 26 continental (neighbouring) European democracies and Bayesian spatial modelling, the results indicate that while today's empirical patterns of democracy in terms of proportional power diffusion can be traced back to waves of democratisation rather than historical partisan power configurations, decentral power diffusion can partially be explained by socio‐structural factors, and spatial dependencies exist for all variants of power diffusion.

show abstract

“…Essentially, federalism is about the distribution of authority between central government and state governments (Bednar , 270). Federal reform is therefore inherently a delicate venture since efficiency considerations usually are an important factor affecting fiscal allocation and spending control (Braun , 4; Benz and Colino , 382). This again implies potential power shifts between the two levels involved.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strength through Weakness: State Executive Power and Federal Reform in Austria

Karlhofer

Pallaver

2013

Swiss Political Sci Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Due to the absence of a strong constitutional veto player, comparative research uses to classify Austria as country with weak federal structures, occasionally even as a "federation without federalism". From an institutional perspective, the assessment is definitely correct, in particular with regard to the nearly insignificant status of the second chamber Bundesrat. Apart from constitutional provisions, however, there are informal forces at work in decision-making processes. Our thesis is that any approach ignoring the fact that the nominal constitution is paralleled by a real one falls short. Instead, we focus on the Conference of State Governors which, though not established by law, is a strong player in Austria's multi-layered system qualifying the picture of "weak" federalism. The paper gives on overview of origin and function of the conference and its ambivalent role in making up for the shortcomings of the federal structures. Taking recent attempts of reorganizing fiscal equalization between states and federation as an example, the need of reforming the allocation of rights and duties between the different levels and, at the same time, the obstacles blocking the reform is outlined and analyzed.

show abstract

Constitutional Change in Federations—A Framework for Analysis

Cited by 40 publications

References 53 publications

Fiscal federalism in the twenty-first century

Fiscal federalism in the twenty-first century

Conflict, choice or geography? Explaining patterns of democracy in continental Europe

Strength through Weakness: State Executive Power and Federal Reform in Austria

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About