Constitutional othering, ambiguity and subjective risks of mobilization in Hungary: examples from the migration crisis

Majtényi, Balázs; Kopper, Ákos; Susánszky, Pál

doi:10.1080/13510347.2018.1493051

Cited by 26 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…The earlier norms that the opposition could set up select committees in parliament (Enyedi 2015) are disregarded and the government no longer uses normal parliamentary procedures to submit bills to avoid legal obligations to initiate social consultation with civil society groups and opposition parties. Instead, the standard became that individual MPs submit bills, often through the fast-track procedure, because in such cases no consultations need to take place and there is no time to contest Fidesz proposals (Majtényi, Kopper, and Susánszky 2019). Since there is no transparency in the legislative process and the opposition cannot interfere, parliament lost its role and just rubberstamps Fidesz's proposals.…”

Section: Party State Capturementioning

confidence: 99%

Caesarean politics in Hungary and Poland

Sata¹,

Karolewski

2019

East European Politics

121

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We propose the new concept of Caesarean politics to explain democratic deconsolidation in Hungary and Poland. We argue the move towards illiberal democracy in both countries has been made possible by a shift towards Caesarean politics, in which radical changes are framed as "politics as usual", while in fact these challenge the essence of liberal democracy. Focusing on the three pillars of Caesarean politics: (1) patronal politics, (2) state capture, and (3) identity politics, we show how both countries become cases of Caesarean politics, where, using discourses of "friends" and "enemies", the leader coordinates vast patronal networks that capture the state.

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Section: Party State Capturementioning

confidence: 99%

Caesarean politics in Hungary and Poland

Sata¹,

Karolewski

2019

East European Politics

121

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“…After the 2010 election, Fidesz introduced changes into the working of the Hungarian political system. In the name of the 'system of national cooperation' as the Prime minister calls the reformed political system, they enacted a new constitution (Batory 2016;Majtényi et al 2019;Várnagy and Ilonszki 2017), centralized the media (Polyák 2019), and vehemently attacked the civil sphere (Kövér 2015). Most of these changes have been launched without consultation and without considering the critiques of the opposition parties and civil organizations.…”

Section: The Opposition In a Cartel Party Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hungary’s Over-powerful Government Party and the Desperate Opposition

Susánszky¹,

Unger

Kopper

2020

European Review

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This paper focuses on Hungary’s illiberal regimes from the perspective of the opposition – a perspective we believe has been under-scrutinized so far. It argues that in order to understand the regime’s success it is crucial to explain why opposition parties have been unable to offer a credible alternative. The paper argues that the opposition is in a trap with three unfavourable factors mutually strengthening each other and undermining its ability for success. They are (1) the cartel party system; (2) the weak social embeddedness of opposition parties; and (3) lack of their presence in local politics. At the same time, we also point out that the rise of a tiny joke-party’s success (The Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party) highlights that these obstacles can be overcome even with very limited resources. Nevertheless, it is still unclear if the Dog Party’s innovative approach to doing politics could be ‘institutionalized’ – i.e. if it offers a feasible model strategy for opposition parties – or it is only an efficient way of mocking and criticizing how the political system operates.

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“…In this study, I examine the risks of protest as perceived by Hungarian university students, because Hungary as an illiberal member state of the European Union is neither a democracy like Western European countries, nor an autocracy like Zimbabwe. Incarcerating and shooting demonstrators is not happening in Hungary, yet as we found, in 2014 citizens (and not the zealous extremists) saw demonstrations as somewhat risky (Majtényi, Kopper and Susánszky, 2019).…”

Section: Previous Research On Perceived Risks and Protest Participationmentioning

confidence: 62%

Demobilization Processes

Susánszky¹

2020

Intersections

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There is abundant literature on individual-level characteristics that encourage citizens to participate in political demonstrations. However, empirical studies on demobilization and factors that prevent people from joining protests remain scarce. In this paper, I zero in on the perceived risks of political participation. Two questions are examined: first, how protest willingness is shaped by perceived risks, and second, what political and socio-economic factors explain risk perception. I answer these questions using the representative sample of 800 Hungarian university students from the Active Youth Survey (2019). Hungary has a special position in Europe because it is defined neither as a liberal democracy nor as sheer autocracy, but an ‘illiberal regime’. In non-democratic illiberal societies the state does not apply overt repressive techniques against dissident groups, although protest participation is still not a riskless form of political action, as regarded in developed democracies. I apply logistic regression models to predict both protest willingness and perceived risks of protest. Results confirm the importance of risks in extra-parliamentary protest politics, since almost half of the university students see their participation in demonstrations as somewhat risky. Regression models show that perceived risks are to some extent politicized, but risks have their own significant role in explaining protest (un)willingness.

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Constitutional othering, ambiguity and subjective risks of mobilization in Hungary: examples from the migration crisis

Cited by 26 publications

References 25 publications

Caesarean politics in Hungary and Poland

Caesarean politics in Hungary and Poland

Hungary’s Over-powerful Government Party and the Desperate Opposition

Demobilization Processes

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