Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism

Lenaerts, Koenraad

doi:10.2307/840100

Cited by 192 publications

(13 citation statements)

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“…In exercising that jurisdiction, supranational organizations are capable of constraining the behavior of all actors, including the member states, within those domains. Many would argue that 'federal politics' would be the appropriate label (Lenaerts 1990;Sbragia 1992Sbragia , 1993. We use the term 'supranational,' in part, to emphasize that the EC is an international organization, and that EC politics is a form of international politics.…”

Section: Figure I Governance In the European Unionmentioning

confidence: 99%

European integration and supranational governance

Sweet

Sandholtz

1997

Journal of European Public Policy

422

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Section: Figure I Governance In the European Unionmentioning

confidence: 99%

European integration and supranational governance

Sweet

Sandholtz

1997

Journal of European Public Policy

422

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“…The phrase thus captures the transformation of an intergovernmental organization governed by international law into a multi-tiered system of governance founded on higher law constitutionalism. Today, legal scholars and judges conceptualize the EC as a constitutional polity, and this is the orthodox position (Lenaerts 1990;Mancini 1991;Shapiro 1992;Weiler 1981Weiler , 1991; international relations scholars are more reticent to do so for reasons internal to the development of international relations theory (Stone 1994a). In its decisions, the ECJ has implicitly treated its terms of reference as a constitutional text since the 1960s and today explicitly refers to the treaties as a "constitutional charter" or as "the constitution of the Community" (Fernandez Esteban 1994).…”

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confidence: 99%

Constructing a Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community

1998

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N o international organization in world history has attracted as much scholarly attention as the European Community (EC).l The reason is straightforward: The EC has evolved from a relatively traditional (albeit multifaceted) interstate system into a quasi-federal polity. In a word, Europe has integrated, as the linkages between politics on the EC level and politics on the national level have expanded in scope and deepened in intensity. Scholars working in diverse fields, including public law, international relations, and comparative politics, have been fascinated by the integration process, not least because of the challenge of understanding the reciprocal effect, over time, of international and domestic systems of governance.Current theoretical disagreements about how to understand European integration are largely disputes between intergovernmentalists, whose imagery is drawn from the international regime literature (Garrett 1992;Keohane and Hoffmann 1991;Moravcsik 1991Moravcsik , 1993Taylor 1983), and supranationalists, whose imagery is often federalist (Burley and Mattli 1993; Leibfried and Pierson, eds., 1995;Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996;Sandholtz 1993Sandholtz ,1996Sbragia 1993;Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997). Intergovernmentalists accord relative priority to member state governmentsrepresentatives of the national interest-who bargain with one another in EC fora to fix the terms and limits of integration. Supranationalists (especially the heirs of neofunctionalism), accord relative priority to EC institutions-representatives of the interests of a nascent transnational society-who work with public and priAlec Stone Sweet is Associate Professor and Thomas L. Brunell is a Ph.D. candidate, Department of Politics and Society, School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697-5100.The authors are grateful to the National Science Foundation, Grant No. SBR-9412531, the National Endowment for the Humanities, Grant No. FA-32480-94, the European Court of Justice, and the Robert Schuman Centre of the European University Institute for their support of this research. We also wish to thank James Caporaso, Lisa Conant, Russell Dalton, Harry Eckstein, Jonathon Golub, Bernard Grofman, Ronald Jepperson, Gary King, and Wayne Sandholtz for helpful comments.Although "European Union" is now commonly used to denote the European polity, we use "European Community" throughout. Formally, the EC remains distinct from the EU, and the EC is the most inclusive term for how the organization and its legal system function most of the time.vate actors at both the European and national levels to remove barriers to integration and to expand the domain of supranational governance. This paper is implicated in these disputes. One of our claims is that, on crucial points, the intergovernmentalists have gotten it wrong.More important, we propose a theory of European legal integration, the process by which Europe has constructed a transnational rule-of-law polity. The theory integrates, as interdependent causal factors, contrac...

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“…172 The uncertain nature of the European Union allows the Court to play the role of an institution responsible for giving the European project momentum, which is tacitly approved by the actors with decision-making power. The Court's pronouncements are sometimes even taken as conclusive evidence for the constitutional character of the Union; 173 but it is a generally accepted narrative of European integration that it was the Court that 'constitutionalised' it. 174 As Damian Chalmers notes, 'judicial supremacy has been a central seam in the EU legal order', although he explains that it has applied in an extremely limited domain.…”

Section: The European Court Of Justice: Problems Of An Incomplete Tramentioning

confidence: 99%

Judicial Lawmaking and Precedent in Supreme Courts

Komárek

2011

SSRN Journal

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What does it mean for a supreme court to 'make law'? When is it possible to say that its decisions are 'precedents'? To what extent should a supreme court's pronouncements be taken into account by others -lower courts and political branches? And how should these other actors reason with such precedents? This article shows how a particular approach to judicial lawmaking and precedent shapes answers to these questions and examines them in relation to the US Supreme Court and the French Cour de cassation. The findings are then used for a critical analysis of the European Court of Justice's case law. It is suggested that while the US and French systems have found some ways of reconciling judicial lawmaking with the basic premises of their constitutional and political systems (although they are not entirely satisfactory), the EU system is still waiting for an account of the Court's lawmaking and precedent. The conclusion indicates directions of possible further research relevant for all courts examined.

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Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism

Cited by 192 publications

References 0 publications

European integration and supranational governance

European integration and supranational governance

Constructing a Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community

Judicial Lawmaking and Precedent in Supreme Courts

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