Constraining Presidential Ambition: Controversy and the Decline of Signing Statements

Abstract

Although signing statements have been touted as a powerful addition to the president's toolkit, their use has dropped off considerably in recent years. We argue that this decrease can be explained by the changing costs of using signing statements. In particular, we posit that Congress' response to signing statements, which included committee hearings on the use of signing statements, raised the costs of this tool above any potential benefits. Investigating over 650 presidential signing statements among over 1,800 public laws, we find that public and congressional outcry influenced the issuance of signing statements and helps explain their decreased use.

Control without Confirmation: The Politics of Vacancies in Presidential Appointments

“…Yet, scholars typically frame threats to separation of powers in terms of presidents usurping power not provided by the Constitution or congressional delegation (e.g., Chiou and Rothenberg 2017;Moe and Howell 1999) rather than presidents sidestepping that power. Indeed, existing research examines expansions of presidential policymaking power through executive orders (e.g., Howell 2003), proclamations (Rottinghaus and Maier 2007), signing statements (Sievert and Ostrander 2017), and presidential memoranda (Lowande 2014) as strategic tools that can unilaterally achieve policy goals without legislation (Ouyang and Waterman 2015). Others address how presidents influence policy by unilaterally constructing more controllable agencies (Howell and Lewis 2002) or adjusting the number of political appointees within agencies (Lewis 2005).…”

Presidential Communication During the Legislative Process

“…First, the president's statutorily defined role in the formulation of the annual budget means the president is already more directly involved. Not surprisingly, appropriations bills are a frequent target of presidential communication (Hassell and Kernell, 2016; Ostrander and Sievert, 2013; Sievert and Ostrander, 2017). Second, appropriations bills are must pass legislation, which changes the stakes for both the Congress and the president.…”

“…We code a bill as 1 if it was identified by Mayhew as a landmark piece of legislation and 0 otherwise. Lastly, we expect presidents to be especially attentive on matters related to foreign affairs (Lewallen, 2017; Ostrander and Sievert, 2013; Sievert and Ostrander, 2017). We used the Policy Agenda Project (PAP) issue codes for each public law to identify whether or not a bill is related to foreign affairs.…”

Policy Making in the Shadow of Executive Action

“…Congress can respond to signing statements in multiple ways. Congress can pass subsequent legislation to limit a signing statement, withhold funding for implementation, hold hearings on their usage, and increase oversight in response to them (Ainsworth, Harwood, and Moffett ; Ainsworth et al ; Kelley ; Sievert and Ostrander ). Indeed, there is evidence that these responses become more likely as the scope of the objections in a signing statement increase (Ainsworth, Harwood, and Moffett ).…”

“…The late Senator Arlen Specter similarly noted that the president should not use the signing statement to “selectively nullify those provisions he does not like” (Stanton ). In 2006 and 2007, Congress acted on these opinions and held hearings on the president’s use of signing statements, signaling that they were a significant concern to members (Sievert and Ostrander ). All of this suggests that signing statements have influence over policy outcomes or are believed to; as such, legislators likely consider the possibility of these actions when deciding upon legislation.…”