Since the 1970s, American politics has taken an impressive turn away from political dealignment and moved toward a more responsible party system. As a result, elections have become more nationalized, a process by which presidential and national politics exert greater influence over down-ballot contests. We evaluate nationalization in electoral contests for two high-profile offices—U.S. Senate and governor—that encompass the same constituencies but constitute markedly different job descriptions and mandated responsibilities. Our analysis utilizes both macro- and micro-level data (election returns and surveys, respectively) to assess patterns of nationalization in these elections. Although it is perhaps not surprising that the linkage between presidential and senatorial contests has tightened, it appears national political forces now also exert greater influence over gubernatorial contests. Nonetheless, we do find regional variation in the nationalization of senatorial and gubernatorial politics, which is more evident in the latter office.

Presidential signing statements, especially "constitutional" ones, have been characterized as line-item vetoes and a general abuse of power. But are signing statements so sinister? We suggest that the popular unilateral powers framework, as applied to signing statements, is inappropriate and that signing statements of all types function more like a dialogue with Congress. Using content analysis of all signing statements from 1977 to 2010, we demonstrate that signing statements routinely address general interbranch themes rather than the substance of a law. We thus provide a new perspective on presidential signing statements as a continuation of interbranch dialogue.

Signing statements constitute a salient executive power that has recently captured scholarly and political attention. Prior literature suggests that presidents use signing statements to gain additional policy concessions from Congress. Evidence of policy motivations are, however, difficult to demonstrate and policy motives fail to explain a wide range of existing statements. The authors propose an additional incentive mechanism based on defending traditional presidential authority. Using original data on approximately 8,500 public laws and 1,250 signing statements, the authors investigate when and why signing statements occur. They find presidents are likely to issue constitutional signing statements on bills traditionally falling under the president’s purview.

Legislative scholars have investigated both the growth in the incumbency advantage since the early 1970s and its decline in recent decades, but there are several unanswered questions about this phenomenon. In this paper, we examine the incumbency advantage across a much wider swath of history to better understand its connection with changing levels of electoral nationalization. Based on an analysis of U.S. House elections extending back to the antebellum era, we find that the incumbency advantage fluctuates in predictable ways over time with changes in nationalization, which can be a product of both institutional and political conditions. We also demonstrate that the increased influence of local forces in congressional elections may not be strictly necessary nor sufficient for the existence of an incumbency advantage.

Although signing statements have been touted as a powerful addition to the president's toolkit, their use has dropped off considerably in recent years. We argue that this decrease can be explained by the changing costs of using signing statements. In particular, we posit that Congress' response to signing statements, which included committee hearings on the use of signing statements, raised the costs of this tool above any potential benefits. Investigating over 650 presidential signing statements among over 1,800 public laws, we find that public and congressional outcry influenced the issuance of signing statements and helps explain their decreased use.