2017
DOI: 10.1080/14608944.2016.1247259
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Constructing a social space for Alevi political identity: religion, antagonism and collective passion

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Cited by 17 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…The challenge to Alevis' political participation comes not only from the narrow Turkish minority regime rooted in the Treaty of Lausanne but also from the limited capacity of the EU and transnational advocacy networks to pressure the Turkish state. The beginning of Turkey's accession talks with the EU following its official recognition as a candidate for EU membership at the 1999 Helsinki Summit paved the way for the emergence of new networking and mobilization channels for Alevis in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Tekdemir 2018). The ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as part of Turkey's EU accession process strengthened "the impact of the ECtHR jurisprudence on the protection of human rights in Turkey" and encouraged Alevis to make claims before the Court (Kurban 2010, 169).…”
Section: Shattered Hopes: the Turkish Alevi Openingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The challenge to Alevis' political participation comes not only from the narrow Turkish minority regime rooted in the Treaty of Lausanne but also from the limited capacity of the EU and transnational advocacy networks to pressure the Turkish state. The beginning of Turkey's accession talks with the EU following its official recognition as a candidate for EU membership at the 1999 Helsinki Summit paved the way for the emergence of new networking and mobilization channels for Alevis in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Tekdemir 2018). The ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as part of Turkey's EU accession process strengthened "the impact of the ECtHR jurisprudence on the protection of human rights in Turkey" and encouraged Alevis to make claims before the Court (Kurban 2010, 169).…”
Section: Shattered Hopes: the Turkish Alevi Openingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…20 Rather, Alevis in such neighborhoods constituted a significant part of revolutionary organizations providing a space for urban Alevis to be active and visible in political life in the domain of Marxist organizations, "even though they appeared not as Alevis but as socialists." 21 In this sense, the 1970s witnessed "not the politicization of Alevism as an independent politics of identity, but rather the politicization of Alevis through their affiliation with leftist politics." 22 In this era, a specific confluence of social factors led to the alliance between the Alevis in urban space and revolutionary movements: while the socialist groups embraced Alevis as "proto-communist" 23 due to their historical opposition to the establishment, on the other hand, Alevis as a socially and economically marginalized group became more open to the possibility of Marxist ideologies-especially the young generation-solving the historical problems of oppression; and "for the most part identif[ied] themselves with the universalistic worldviews offered by socialism and Marxism," 24 bringing about an attraction and overlapping between the social-political culture of Alevis and the political agenda of revolutionary movements.…”
Section: Ethnographic Context: Okmeydanı and Alevismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In terms of a symbol of a new political strategy and language of resistance, it was also connected to the rebellion that had largely started at the beginning of the 20th century and made claim to a shared Kurdish legacy and heritage of national identity. The agents of this new identity recognised the fragmented structure of Kurdish society that was divided by religion, language and territory and, despite being heavily secular themselves, granted equal public space, and hence in their own movements, to a plurality of religions with equal recognition given to Zoroastrianism, Yezidizm, Judaism and eastern Christianity alongside Alevism and Sunnism (Tekdemir, 2018a(Tekdemir, , 2018b. Their support for a plural public space was also aimed at providing equality for the various Kurdish dialects such as Zazaki, Sorani and Kurmanji that were spoken across Iraq, Syria, Iran, Turkey and some of the former Soviet states like Armenia and Azerbaijan, along with the recognition of geographical differences.…”
Section: The Emerging Agonistic Debate On the Kurdish Political Spectrummentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They live predominantly in the east and southeast of the country (McDowall, 2000; Yildiz, 2005), although there has been mass migration of Kurds to Turkey’s western metropolises such as Ankara and Izmir and where Istanbul is now known as one of the largest Kurdish cities in the world (Saracoglu, 2011). While the majority of Kurds follow the Sunni-Shafi school of Islam, there are also considerable numbers of Alevis (Tekdemir, 2018a) along with other minority religions such as Yezidis. The Kurds have had a long relationship with the Turks from the 11th-century Seljuk dynasty through to the period of the Ottoman Empire and the Republic.…”
Section: The Formation Of Kurdishness In Its Historical Contextmentioning
confidence: 99%