Constructing PEKS schemes secure against keyword guessing attacks is possible?

Jeong, Ik Rae; Kwon, Jeong Ok; Hong, Dowon; Lee, Dong Hoon

doi:10.1016/j.comcom.2008.11.018

Cited by 109 publications

(49 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…4.3 defines the adversary with capability equivalent to that of the IND-CKA PEKS model and the IND-CKA dPEKS model of [10,11] respectively, i.e., the adversary has oracle access to both the Trapdoor and dTest functions. This also corroborates well with the result of [7] that showed consistency implies impossibility against KGA, where the implication proof required that the KG adversary has access to the Test function and be given the challenge ciphertext C * and challenge trapdoor T * w .…”

Section: Security Models For (D)peks Against Kg−ckasupporting

confidence: 77%

“…Yau et al [14] later showed some similar attacks on dPEKS and PEKS schemes of [2,3]. In a different vein, Jeong et al [7] showed that consistency implies insecurity to keyword guessing attacks in PEKS, where consistency means that it is not possible to find two keywords such that the Test function states that the PEKS ciphertext of one keyword and the trapdoor for the other keyword contain the same keyword.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Security models for delegated keyword searching within encrypted contents

Yau

Phan

Heng

et al. 2012

J Internet Serv Appl

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Within modern internet infrastructure including networks that are ubiquitous, there is often a need for delegatable communication between nodes without compromising the confidentiality of information. In practice, this should be enforced while allowing some basic functionality for intermediate delegated nodes such as searching through encrypted content. This can be achieved using a Public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) scheme, first proposed by Boneh et al., which enables to search publicly encrypted messages for keywords without revealing any information about the message. The issue of PEKS schemes being vulnerable to keyword guessing attacks (KGAs) was first shown by Byun et al., and two of the most recent PEKS schemes, i.e., due to

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Section: Security Models For (D)peks Against Kg−ckasupporting

confidence: 77%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security models for delegated keyword searching within encrypted contents

Yau

Phan

Heng

et al. 2012

J Internet Serv Appl

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show abstract

“…As observed by Jeong et al [20], in the case when the attacker is the server, SCF-PEKS consistency implies insecurity against keyword guessing attacks. To highlight this observation, let us consider the work presented in [29].…”

Section: Two Types Of Attackers In Scf-peksmentioning

confidence: 75%

Public key encryption with keyword search secure against keyword guessing attacks without random oracle

Fang

Susilo

et al. 2013

Information Sciences

195

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. Public key encryption with keyword search secure against keyword guessing attacks without random oracle. Information Sciences, 238 221-241.Public key encryption with keyword search secure against keyword guessing attacks without random oracle AbstractThe notion of public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) was put forth by Boneh et al. to enable a server to search from a collection of encrypted emails given a "trapdoor" (i.e., an encrypted keyword) provided by the receiver. The nice property in this scheme allows the server to search for a keyword, given the trapdoor. Hence, the verifier can merely use an untrusted server, which makes this notion very practical. Following Boneh et al. 's work, there have been subsequent works that have been proposed to enhance this notion. Two important notions include the so-called keyword guessing attack and secure channel free, proposed by Byun et al. and Baek et al., respectively. The former realizes the fact that in practice, the space of the keywords used is very limited, while the latter considers the removal of secure channel between the receiver and the server to make PEKS practical. Unfortunately, the existing construction of PEKS secure against keyword guessing attack is only secure under the random oracle model, which does not reflect its security in the real world. Furthermore, there is no complete definition that captures secure channel free PEKS schemes that are secure against chosen keyword attack, chosen ciphertext attack, and against keyword guessing attacks, even though these notions seem to be the most practical application of PEKS primitives. In this paper, we make the following contributions. First, we define the strongest model of PEKS which is secure channel free and secure against chosen keyword attack, chosen ciphertext attack, and keyword guessing attack. In particular, we present two important security notions namely IND-SCF-CKCA and IND-KGA. The former is to capture an inside adversary, while the latter is to capture an outside adversary. Intuitively, it should be clear that IND-SCF-CKCA captures a more stringent attack compared to IND-KGA. Second, we present a secure channel free PEKS scheme secure without random oracle under the well known assumptions, namely DLP, DBDH, SXDH and truncated q-ABDHE assumption. Our contributions fill the gap in the literature and hence, making the notion of PEKS Keywords without, against, random, oracle, secure, encryption, key, public, guessing, search, keyword, attacks AbstractThe notion of public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) was put forth by Boneh et al. to enable a server to search from a collection of encrypted emails given a "trapdoor" (i.e., an encrypted keyword) provided by the receiver. The nice property in this scheme allows the server to search for a keyword, given the trapdoor. Hence, the verifier can merely use an untrusted server, which makes this notion very practical. Following Boneh et al.'s work, there have been subsequent works that have been proposed to enhance this notion. T...

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“…Furthermore, the subsequent papers [9,18] investigated the secure combination of public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) with public key data encryption (PKE). Since the fact that keywords are chosen from much smaller space than passwords and users usually use well-known keywords for search, the work in [6,13,15,17] studied the off-line keyword guessing attacks on PEKS.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Secure Channel Free Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search Scheme without Random Oracle

Fang

Susilo

et al. 2009

Cryptology and Network Security

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Abstract. The public key encryption with keyword Search (PEKS) scheme, proposed by Boneh, Di Crescenzo, Ostrovsky and Persiano, enables one to search for encrypted keywords without compromising the security of the original data. Baek et al. noticed that the original notion of PEKS requires the existence of a secure channel, and they further extended this notion by proposing an efficient secure channel free public key encryption scheme with keyword search in the random oracle model. In this paper, we take one step forward by adopting Baek et al.'s model and propose a new and efficient scheme that does not require any secure channels, and furthermore, its security does not use random oracles.

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Constructing PEKS schemes secure against keyword guessing attacks is possible?

Cited by 109 publications

References 11 publications

Security models for delegated keyword searching within encrypted contents

Security models for delegated keyword searching within encrypted contents

Public key encryption with keyword search secure against keyword guessing attacks without random oracle

A Secure Channel Free Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search Scheme without Random Oracle

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