Construction of gender identities via satire: The case of Juvenal

Abstract

Many studies underscore the societal aspects of satire, yet its role in the construction of social subjects' identities has been mostly ignored. Since satire has been ubiquitous in various cultures and epochs, and identity is also among the primary contemporary concerns in our globalised and multicultural world, the study of the role of satire in the construction of social subjects' identities can prove to be significantly rewarding. Accordingly, this article aims to investigate how satire can contribute to the construction of gender identity in social subjects. It is proposed that opposition/otherness/difference is the common denominator between satire and gender identity. First, different theories of humour are surveyed to show that opposition is integral to satire. Then, it is conveyed that otherness and opposition are similarly essential in the construction of gender identity in both men and women. As opposition can be a common denominator on the axis of sex, satire can be among the determinants of gender identity construction. In the end, Juvenal's Satire VI is explicated to further illustrate the theoretical argumentation. It is concluded that the opposition essential to satire can coalesce with the integral otherness in gender identity, hence to contribute to its construction.

Reflexive humor and satire: a critical review

“…This is despite the intriguing presence of reflexive humour and satire since early conceptualizations of satire in Erasmus' The Praise of Folly, where the title character directs humour and satire against herself (see also Condren 2012;Chaudhury 2014). Elsewhere, I have argued in detail that because satire and humour frequently depend on opposition, they can contribute to the construction of social subjects' identities as they also rely on otherness (Zekavat 2017, Zekavat andPourgiv 2015). This otherness can be internal and psychological at an individual level in reflexive humour, and, at a social level, "the selfhood of oneself implies otherness to such an intimate degree that one cannot be thought of without the other, that instead one passes into the other, as we might say in Hegelian terms" (Ricoeur 1994: 3).…”