Constructivism

Barry, Melissa

doi:10.4324/9781315213217-25

Cited by 3 publications

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“…32 32 Refer to Street (2010, pp. 366–367) and Barry (2018, pp. 385–389).…”

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confidence: 99%

Practical Intelligibility and Moral Skepticism: Should Realists Worry About Grass‐Counters and Hand‐Claspers?

Lott

2021

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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The focus of this paper is the following claim: as a purely conceptual matter, the moral truths could be pretty much anything, and we should assume this in assessing our reliability at grasping moral truths. This claim, which I call No Content, plays a key role in an important skeptical argument against realist moral knowledge – the Normative Lottery Argument. In this paper, I argue that moral realists can, and should, reject No Content. My argument centers on the idea of practical intelligibility. I explore different aspects of practical intelligibility, and I argue that such intelligibility sets a constraint on the possibilities we should consider when assessing our reliability at grasping moral truths.

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“…32 32 Refer to Street (2010, pp. 366–367) and Barry (2018, pp. 385–389).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Practical Intelligibility and Moral Skepticism: Should Realists Worry About Grass‐Counters and Hand‐Claspers?

Lott

2021

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Metaethics and the conceptual ethics of normativity

McPherson

Plunkett

2021

Inquiry

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This paper argues for the value of distinguishing two projects concerning our normative and evaluative thought and talk, which we dub "metanormative inquiry" and "the conceptual ethics of normativity" respectively. The first half of the paper offers a substantive account of each project and of the relationship between them. Roughly, metanormative inquiry aims to understand actual normative and evaluative thought and talk, and what (if anything) it is distinctively about, while the conceptual ethics of normativity engages in normative or evaluative reflection on normative and evaluative thought and talk. We explore how certain theories of content determination complicate the distinction between these projects, but argue that both the distinction and its significance survive these complications. The second half of the paper argues that attention to the distinction between these projects can promote progress in both projects in three ways. First, it can transform our understanding and evaluation of views that are routinely classified as part of "metaethics". Second, it can help us to identify important theoretical options that otherwise tend to remain obscure. And, third, it can help us to avoid tempting but fallacious arguments which can easily arise if the projects are not distinguished.

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A Question of One’s Own

Ebels-Duggan¹

2022

Normativity and Agency

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A modest constructivism that endorses the constructivist account of moral concepts, but gives up on the idea of deriving normative conceptions from them, retains most of the advantages of the more ambitious view that embraces both theses. It can address Prichard’s Dilemma and parry metaphysical and epistemological challenges. It cannot answer all intelligible skeptical questions. But this paper argues that it can answer all those that are ours in Christine Korsgaard’s important sense.

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Constructivism

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Practical Intelligibility and Moral Skepticism: Should Realists Worry About Grass‐Counters and Hand‐Claspers?

Practical Intelligibility and Moral Skepticism: Should Realists Worry About Grass‐Counters and Hand‐Claspers?

Metaethics and the conceptual ethics of normativity

A Question of One’s Own

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