Containing Land Grabs: a misguided response to rural conflicts over land

Failure by design – National mandates and agent control of local land use in China

“…The land use syndrome, appropriation of unnecessarily large amount of agricultural land, nontransparent processes of transferring land use rights from the state to interested land users, and corruption occurred in land transactions and the distribution of compensation fees to farmers have jeopardized the optimal use of land (Brown, 1995;Chen, 2007;Lichtenberg and Ding, 2006), fueled a sense of injustice in Chinese society (Yep, 2013;Zhu, 2002), eroded public trust in the government (Li, 2004), and led to social unrest (China Daily, 2010;Wenling Democratic Consultation Meeting, 2010;Page and Spegele, 2011). In response, the central government introduced policy changes for revealing its own preferences and regulating local governments.…”

“…Previous studies have examined land use patterns and implications for food security (Chen, 2007;Deng et al, 2006;Ding and Zhao, 2011;Lichtenberg and Ding, 2006;Verburg et al, 2000), economic and political incentives of and measures taken by local governments to expropriate (zhengshou ) and compulsorily acquire (zhengyong ) rural land (Ding, 2003;Ho and Lin, 2004;Lichtenberg and Ding, 2009;Long et al, 2007;Zhu, 2002), and price differences incurred by rural peasants, local governments, and land developers in different stages of transactions on land use rights (Lin, 2011;Lin and Ho, 2005;Wei and Zhao, 2009;Xu et al, 2009;Yan and Xu, 2010;Yep, 2013). Public participation is a useful mechanism for involving stakeholders in defining purposes, identifying actors, and designing the architecture of environmental and natural resources governance that will deliver desirable environmental, economic, and social outcomes (Li, 2006;Ostrom, 1990;United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2009).…”

Grand Mediation and Legitimacy Enhancement in Contemporary China—the Guang'an model

“…47 We call their protests the 'resistance of the weak', which is allowed by law but prohibited by Chinese politics. As both parties have rational calculations on the specific issues and want to gain what they want through bargaining, the result is a non-judicial method of dispute settlement-GM as an example-to meet the citizens' requests to seek compensation and justice while meeting the government's need to defuse protests and reduce social threats.…”

Nonmarketization Bargaining and Actual Compensation Level for Land Requisition: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of China’s Land Requisition Conflict Events

“…It cannot sufficiently guarantee land-losing farmers' future working and living, and it cannot establish a long-term mechanism for farmers to share in a land increment benefit. This has inevitably led to the discontent, doubt, and confrontation of land-losing farmers and the rise of collective visit events and land requisition conflict events all over the country [19].…”