Contemporary Epistemic Logic and the Lockean Thesis

Demey, Lorenz

doi:10.1007/s10699-012-9292-9

Cited by 12 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…The significance of these observations is further discussed in [24]. Several fruitful applications of probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic can be expected in the fields of game theory and cognitive science.…”

Section: Further Developments and Applicationsmentioning

confidence: 93%

Logic and Probabilistic Update

Demey

Kooi²

2014

Outstanding Contributions to Logic

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This paper surveys recent work on probabilistic extensions of epistemic and dynamic-epistemic logics (the latter include the basic system of public announcement logic as well as the full product update logic). It emphasizes the importance of higher-order information as a distinguishing feature of these logics. This becomes particularly clear in the dynamic setting: although there exists a clear relationship between usual Bayesian conditionalization and public announcement, the probabilistic effects of the latter are in general more difficult to describe, because of the subtleties involved in higher-order information. Finally, the paper discusses some applications of probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic, such as the Lockean thesis in formal epistemology and Aumann's agreement theorem in game theory.

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Section: Further Developments and Applicationsmentioning

confidence: 93%

Logic and Probabilistic Update

Demey

Kooi²

2014

Outstanding Contributions to Logic

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“…Weaker signals produce weaker requirements. 24 To illustrate, suppose belief is equivalent to credence at or above a context-sensitive threshold (Sturgeon, 2008;Demey, 2013;Leitgeb, 2014;Dorst, 2019). Then hedged testimony warranting an update to credences at or above that threshold would also warrant belief.…”

Section: Hedging and The Responsibility Component Of Testimonymentioning

confidence: 99%

Hedged testimony

Elswyk

2022

Nous

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Speakers offer testimony. They also hedge. This essay offers an account of how hedging makes a difference to testimony. Two components of testimony are considered: how testimony warrants a hearer's attitude, and how testimony changes a speaker's responsibilities. Starting with a norm‐based approach to testimony where hearer's beliefs are prima facie warranted because of social norms and speakers acquire responsibility from these same norms, I argue that hedging alters both components simultaneously. It changes which attitudes a hearer is prima facie warranted in forming in response to testimony, and reduces how much responsibility a speaker undertakes in testifying. A consequence of this account is that speakers who hedge merely for strategic purposes deprive their hearers of warrant for stronger doxastic attitudes.

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“…7.8;. 16 See Demey (2013), Easwaran (2015), Easwaran and Fitelson (2015), Foley (2009), Kroedel (2011) or Sturgeon (2008). See also Schechter (2013) on the failure of Closure.…”

Section: A Worry Concerning Coherence and Beliefs About Blamementioning

confidence: 99%

A Puzzle About Knowledge, Blame, and Coherence

Daoust

2019

Acta Anal

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Many philosophers have offered arguments in favor of the following three theses: (i) A is epistemically permitted (or required) to believe P only if A is in a position to know that P, (ii) incoherent agents fail to satisfy the aforementioned knowledge norm of belief, and (iii) A's apparent reasons are relevant to determining what A is blameworthy for believing. In this paper, I argue that the above three theses are jointly inconsistent. The main upshot of the paper is this: even if the knowledge norm of belief is correct, it cannot explain some deontic requirements governing belief.

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Contemporary Epistemic Logic and the Lockean Thesis

Cited by 12 publications

References 23 publications

Logic and Probabilistic Update

Logic and Probabilistic Update

Hedged testimony

A Puzzle About Knowledge, Blame, and Coherence

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