Contest success functions: an extension

Clark, Derek J.; Riis, Christian

doi:10.1007/s001990050184

Cited by 293 publications

(187 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…8 Since we consider a …xed vector of e¤orts G, we will simply use the notation f i instead of f i (G i ) and f instead of f (G). An allocation in a contest problem is a n-tuple p = (p 1 ; :::; p n ) 2 R n with 0 p i 1 and P n i=1 p i = 1.…”

Section: ' Classical'bargainingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Foundations for contest success functions

Corchón

Dahm

2008

Econ Theory

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In the literature the outcome of contests is either interpreted as win probabilities or as shares of the prize. With this in mind, we examine two approaches to contest success functions. In the …rst we analyze the implications of contestants' incomplete information concerning the 'type' of the contest administrator. While in the case of two contestants this approach can rationalize prominent contest success functions, we show that it runs into di¢ culties when there are more agents. Our second approach interprets contest success functions as sharing rules and establishes a connection to bargaining and claims problems which is independent of the number of contestants. Both approaches provide foundations for popular contest success functions and guidelines for the de…nition of new ones.

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Section: ' Classical'bargainingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Foundations for contest success functions

Corchón

Dahm

2008

Econ Theory

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“…17 Accordingly, relative standing considerations suggest that the disadvantaged player B may have a stronger incentive to reject the proposed split than the advantaged player A.…”

Section: Hypothesis 2 (Bargaining Mechanism)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Balance of power and the propensity of conflict

Herbst

Konrad

Morath

2017

Games and Economic Behavior

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may www.econstor.euBalance of power and the propensity of con ‡ict February 27, 2015 AbstractWe study the role of an imbalance in …ghting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of con ‡ict. Our experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of con ‡ict is independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of con ‡ict is higher if power is more imbalanced. Even though endogenous bargaining outcomes re ‡ect the players' unequal …ghting strengths, strategic uncertainty causes outcomes to be most e¢ cient when power is balanced. In turn, the importance of exogenous mediation proposals depends on the balance of power.JEL codes: C78, C91, D72, D74

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“…Suppose first the case of settlement. Each challenger would receive in each period a settlement payment = (1 ) with the 10 Note that this value does not include the cost of which is considered to have been already paid. We continue the same practice in denoting values functions net of this cost below.…”

Section: B An Alternative Litigation Settingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conflict, settlement, and the shadow of the future

McBride

Skaperdas

2014

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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In many instances of potential violent and non-violent conflict the future strategic positions of adversaries are very di erent when there is open conflict than when there is settlement. Then, as the future becomes more important, open conflict becomes more likely than settlement. We theoretically demonstrate this result and discuss its applicability in war, litigation, and other settings. We test for this e ect in a laboratory experiment and find that subjects are more likely to engage in risky conflict as the shadow of the future increases.JEL Classifications: C72, C91, D01, D74.

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Contest success functions: an extension

Cited by 293 publications

References 4 publications

Foundations for contest success functions

Foundations for contest success functions

Balance of power and the propensity of conflict

Conflict, settlement, and the shadow of the future

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