Contested Statehood and State-Building in Haiti

Baranyi, Stephen

doi:10.4067/s0718-090x2012000300013

Cited by 8 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Residents became angry when promises regarding compensation and jobs were slow to materialize. The government's poor capacity to deliver public goods and carry out complex functions has been well documented, so slow implementation of compensation was not surprising (Verner and Egset 2007;Baranyi 2012;Fund for Peace 2016). At the same time, despite weak capacity, the state's ability to extend its coercive power into the hinterland appeared quite solid.…”

Section: Technologies Of Rule?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Assessments of Haiti's security forces are mixed. Reports in 2015 and 2016 documented police use of excessive force against groups protesting large economic development projects (Baranyi andSainsiné 2015, 2016). A 2017 report also indicate police use of repressive tactics against workers protesting an increased production quota at Fairway Apparel textile factory in Port-au-Prince.…”

Section: Technologies Of Rule?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Reflections on Haitian Democracy: Zooming in on a Megaproject in the Hinterland

Shamsie¹

2022

Lat. American Res. Rev.

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Twenty-five years have passed since Haiti's first free and fair elections. In that time, democratization has been slow and there have been many setbacks. This article offers some observations regarding Haiti's democratization journey by examining how the government introduced a massive industrial park that required the displacement of a large number of farmers. In a departure from historical practice, when faced with opposition, the government deployed its security forces sparingly. Also, the levels of transparency and civil society engagement were not terrible. Although it is insufficient and superficial, movement is in the right direction. In contrast, local government officials may have lost status and legitimacy during the process, which could hinder future democratization. Finally, the footprint of outsiders in this project was massive, confirming how profoundly Haiti's democratization is transnationalized. This makes tracking its democratic development extremely challenging and yet necessary given the country is not alone in this predicament.Han pasado veinticinco años desde las primeras elecciones libres y justas en Haití. Desde entonces, la democratización ha sido lenta y ha sufrido muchos contratiempos. Este artículo ofrece algunas observaciones con respecto al proceso de democratización en este momento. Al hacerlo, examina cómo el gobierno ha introducido un extenso parque industrial en el noreste del país, el que requirió el desplazamiento de un gran número de campesinos. Los resultados son mixtos. En una divergencia de la historia, cuando se enfrentó con la oposición, el gobierno envió sus fuerzas de seguridad con moderación. Por otra parte, los niveles de transparencia y el compromiso de la sociedad civil no eran pasables. Aunque puede resultar insuficiente y superficial, el proceso democrático parece ir avanzando en la dirección correcta. Por otro lado, puede ser que los oficiales del gobierno local hayan perdido posición y legitimidad durante el proceso, lo que puede impedir la democratización. Finalmente, el involucramiento de extranjeros en este proyecto era masivo, lo que confirma que la democratización de Haití es transnacional. Así, seguir el desarrollo democrático es algo extremadamente desafiante pero necesario ya que este país no está solo en esta situación.Since the early 1990s, the pattern of democratic development in Haiti has not been encouraging. Numerous setbacks and failures have led observers to pen some pessimistic assessments of Haitian democracy, the quality of which has been judged to be very low. Gloominess is not unjustified: a twice-exiled president; numerous contested and fraudulent elections; a high-enough quotient of political instability to invite an eighteen-year-long UN Stabilization Mission (MINUSTAH); and most recently, the rule by decree of President Michel Martelly during 2014-2015 and the need to repeat the 2015 presidential elections as a result of allegations of "systematic, massive fraud" (Charles 2015a).These institutional faults and weaknesses are easy to perce...

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Section: Technologies Of Rule?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Technologies Of Rule?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Reflections on Haitian Democracy: Zooming in on a Megaproject in the Hinterland

Shamsie¹

2022

Lat. American Res. Rev.

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“…It also avoids conflating possible sources of legitimacy with the concept itself. Moreover, we understand empirical legitimacy as diffuse support for governance actors or institutions in an Eastonian sense (Baranyi 2012, Easton 1975. However, while Easton focuses on political systems such as the state, we broaden the perspective to include international governmental organizations (IOs), foreign governments, and nonstate actors such as companies or (I)NGOs [(international) nongovernmental organizations] as recipients of diffuse support.…”

Section: Conceptual Clarifications Legitimacymentioning

confidence: 99%

Legitimacy in Areas of Limited Statehood

Risse‐Kappen

Stollenwerk

2018

Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.

106

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Empirical legitimacy, defined as social acceptance of the right to rule, constitutes a key condition for effective governance in areas of limited statehood. Most work on legitimacy, however, is state centric and has exclusively focused on the state as the governance actor of interest. We argue that understanding the legitimacy of external and nonstate actors is essential for analyzing governance in areas of limited statehood. Moreover, subnational variations in legitimacy matter. While most studies of the legitimacy of governance actors have focused on the macroregional and national levels, a governance actor may enjoy high legitimacy in one part of a country but be considered illegitimate in other parts. Finally, the multiple sources and consequences of empirical legitimacy in areas of limited statehood have to be analyzed in greater depth. There is no single source of legitimacy, nor is there a single guaranteed consequence of legitimacy.

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“…This is not a study of contested legitimacy (e.g. Baranyi, 2012; Gills, 1996; Sarbo, 2009), as legitimacy would require a certain government to be accepted by the governed (Risse, 2018) as a set of ‘sedimented norms’ shared by a number of subjects (see Butler, 1988). Legitimacy could be an effect of statehood-making practices, which would also be discursively constructed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Performing statehood in Northern Kosovo: Discursive struggle over contested space

Vulovic¹

2020

Cooperation and Conflict

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Since Serbia and Kosovo began their political and technical dialogue mediated by the European Union in 2011, numerous agreements were signed, but few of them implemented. In addition, since 2018 the idea of partitioning Kosovo along ethnic lines has entered public debates. This article asks why that is the case and argues that Northern Kosovo – specifically, who has the right to claim statehood over this area – lies at the heart of why partition was suggested as a viable option and why so few agreements have been implemented. In order to demonstrate this, the article adopts a performative view of statehood, particularly suitable for states ‘in-becoming’, such as Kosovo. As only externally performed statehood has been examined so far, that is, efforts for international recognition, this article extends performativity to internally negotiated statehood, against the background of two political systems competing for legitimacy in the long run. This is the case with Northern Kosovo, conceptualized as an area of overlapping limited statehood. The developed analytical framework can be extended to other cases of territorial disputes, such as Crimea or Palestine. The framework can also be expanded to explore performativity of statehood in areas where statehood is not institutionally disputed, but rather symbolically.

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Contested Statehood and State-Building in Haiti

Cited by 8 publications

References 18 publications

Reflections on Haitian Democracy: Zooming in on a Megaproject in the Hinterland

Reflections on Haitian Democracy: Zooming in on a Megaproject in the Hinterland

Legitimacy in Areas of Limited Statehood

Performing statehood in Northern Kosovo: Discursive struggle over contested space

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