Contextualizing Free Will

Abstract

<jats:p>Hawthorne (2001) toys with the view that ascriptions of free will are context-sensitive. But the way he formulates the view makes freedom contextualism look like a non-starter. I step into the breach for freedom contextualism. My aim is twofold. On the one hand, I argue that freedom contextualism can be motivated on the basis of our ordinary practice of freedom attribution is not ad hoc. The view explains data which cannot be accounted for by an ambiguity hypothesis. On the other hand, I suggest a more plausible freedom contextualist analysis, which emerges naturally once we pair the assumption that freedom requires that the agent could have acted otherwise with a plausible semantics of "can" statements. I'll dub the resulting view Alternate Possibilities Contextualism, or APC, for short. In contrast to Hawthorne's view, APC is well-motivated in its own right, does not beg the question against the incompatibilist and delivers a context parameter which allows for a wide range of context shifts. I conclude that, far from being a non-starter, freedom contextualism sets an agenda worth pursuing.</jats:p>

Problemrekonstruktionen in der Philosophie- und Argumentationsdidaktik

“…Vielleicht sogar beim Thema Willensfreiheit und Determinismus? Diese Position vertritt etwa Romy Jaster, die dafür argumentiert, dass die Wendung "sich anders entscheiden können" in c) und d) verschiedene Bedeutungen hat (Jaster 2020a, 218-224;Jaster 2020b). Auch wenn diese Fragen hier offen bleiben müssen: Mit deutlich fortgeschrittenen Studierenden können auch solche Auflösungen der rekonstruierten Probleme diskutiert werden.…”

Alternative possibilities in context

“…Others who have noted the potential relevance of contextualism about 'can' claims to debates over free will and moral responsibility include Campbell (1997;, Szabo and Knobe (2013), Franklin (2015), List (2014), Grzankowski (2014), Slater (2005) and Jeppsson (2016). Hawthorne (2001), Rieber (2006), Willaschek (2010) and Jaster (2020) all defend contextualist accounts of free will ascriptions too, though, curiously, only Jaster explicitly relates this alleged context-sensitivity of 'free' to the context-sensitivity of 'can'. I will not take a stand in this paper on whether ascriptions of free will are context-sensitive.…”