Continuous decisions by a committee: Median versus average mechanisms

Rosar, Frank

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.010

Cited by 18 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 26 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…This method, (or variations 1 of it) is used in practice in economics and sports. See (Rosar 2015;Trannoy 2005, 2011) for some applications. Assigning the budget proportionally comes with some perks: It can be easily described, it's calculated efficiently and it scales naturally to any number of projects.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals with Proportionality Guarantees

Caragiannis

Christodoulou

Protopapas

2022

AAAI

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We study a participatory budgeting problem, where a set of strategic agents wish to split a divisible budget among different projects by aggregating their proposals on a single division. Unfortunately, the straightforward rule that divides the budget proportionally is susceptible to manipulation. Recently, a class of truthful mechanisms has been proposed, namely the moving phantom mechanisms. One such mechanism satisfies the proportionality property, in the sense that in the extreme case where all agents prefer a single project to receive the whole amount, the budget is assigned proportionally. While proportionality is a naturally desired property, it is defined over a limited type of preference profiles. To address this, we expand the notion of proportionality, by proposing a quantitative framework that evaluates a budget aggregation mechanism according to its worst-case distance from the proportional allocation. Crucially, this is defined for every preference profile. We study this measure on the class of moving phantom mechanisms, and we provide approximation guarantees. For two projects, we show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism is optimal among all truthful mechanisms. For three projects, we propose a new, proportional mechanism that is optimal among all moving phantom mechanisms. Finally, we provide impossibility results regarding the approximability of moving phantom mechanisms.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals with Proportionality Guarantees

Caragiannis

Christodoulou

Protopapas

2022

AAAI

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Renault and Trannoy [30] and Renault and Trannoy [31] explore the equilibria imposed by this mechanism. Rosar [33] compares allocations based on the mean and the median in a single-dimensional domain in a model with incomplete information. In a recent work, Puppe and Rollmann [29] conducted an experimental study between a normalized median rule and the aggregated mean, in a setting similar to ours.…”

Section: Further Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This method, (or variations 1 of it) is used in practice in economics and sports. See [30,32,33] for some applications. Assigning the budget proportionally comes with some perks: it can be easily described, it is calculated efficiently and it scales naturally to any number of projects.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals with Proportionality Guarantees

Caragiannis¹,

Christodoulou²,

Protopapas³

2022

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We study a participatory budgeting problem, where a set of strategic agents wish to split a divisible budget among different projects, by aggregating their proposals on a single division. Unfortunately, the straight-forward rule that divides the budget proportionally is susceptible to manipulation. In a recent work, Freeman et al. [16] proposed a class of truthful mechanisms, called moving phantom mechanisms. Among others, they propose a proportional mechanism, in the sense that in the extreme case where all agents prefer a single project to receive the whole amount, the budget is assigned proportionally.While proportionality is a naturally desired property, it is defined over a limited type of preference profiles. To address this, we expand the notion of proportionality, by proposing a quantitative framework which evaluates a budget aggregation mechanism according to its worst-case distance from the proportional allocation. Crucially, this is defined for every preference profile. We study this measure on the class of moving phantom mechanisms, and we provide approximation guarantees. For two projects, we show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism is the optimal among all truthful mechanisms. For three projects, we propose a new, proportional mechanism which is virtually optimal among all moving phantom mechanisms. Finally, we provide impossibility results regarding the approximability of moving phantom mechanisms.

show abstract

“…3 Other procedures considered in the literature that aim to resolve the tension between mean and median voter (Rosar, 2015) and to discern the intensity of preferences include (Casella, 2005;Fahrenberger and Gersbach, 2010;Hortalà-Vallvé, 2010). Sequential procedures with fixed majority rules are broadly used in European parliaments (Rasch, 2000).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Semi-Flexible Majority Rules for Public Good Provision

Gersbach

Tejada

2017

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We introduce a two-stage, multiple-round voting procedure where the thresholds needed for approval require a qualified majority and vary with the proposal on the table. We apply such a procedure to instances of public-good provision where the citizens' valuations can take two values and are private. We show that the procedure elicits and aggregates the information about the valuations and implements the utilitarian optimal public good level. This level is chosen after all potential socially optimal policies have been considered. We also develop a compound procedure to ensure utilitarian optimality when there are arbitrarily finitely many types of citizen.

show abstract

Continuous decisions by a committee: Median versus average mechanisms

Cited by 18 publications

References 26 publications

Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals with Proportionality Guarantees

Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals with Proportionality Guarantees

Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals with Proportionality Guarantees

Semi-Flexible Majority Rules for Public Good Provision

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About