Contract Design of Logistics Service Supply Chain Based on Smart Transformation

Líu, Hao; Chen, Haodong; Zhang, Heng‐Yi; Yu, Xingwang; Zhang, Shiqing

doi:10.3390/su14106261

Cited by 5 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…By consulting relevant works of literature, we found that the intelligent transformation of logistics services has attracted the attention of many scholars, but there is no literature discussing the capital constraint faced by SMEs. Second, works of literature similar to our study are [24,34]; with them we found that adopting cost-sharing and revenue-sharing contracts can also coordinate the intelligent transformation under capital constraint. However, the difference is that the conditions met in the coordination process are different.…”

Section: Literature Reviewsupporting

confidence: 61%

“…From an ecological perspective, Liu et al [33] used evolutionary game theory to analyze the dynamic cooperation-evolution trend of smart logistics platforms and intelligent LSPs. Liu et al [34] and Liu et al [24] studied the contract design that motivates the intelligent transformation of logistics services. The former focused on the contract design between members of the logistics-service supply chain, whereas the latter focused on the contract design between manufacturing companies and LSPs.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The two-part tariff contract starts from the whole and then realizes the distribution of benefits to increase the benefits of all parties and is widely used as a coordination contract [54,55]. In addition, scholars also used hybrid contracts to analyze the coordination efficiency of different supply chains, such as hybrid two-part tariff contracts [48], cost-sharing and revenue-sharing hybrid contracts [24,34], and wholesale-price and revenue-sharing hybrid contracts [56]. Different from the above literature, this paper considers the different intelligent preferences of consumers and the capital constraint of the LSP in the model construction and discusses how to design contracts to meet different consumer preferences and motivate the LSP for intelligent transformation, thus enriching the research field of intelligent transformation of the logistics-service supply chain.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The logistics-service demand is negatively affected by the sales price p; on the other hand, it is positively affected by the level of intelligence of logistics service y. Referring to the literature [24,34], this paper defines the demand function as q = a − bp + ky; among them, a is the basic demand of the logistics-service market, k is the consumer's preference for the intelligent level of logistics services, and b is the price-sensitivity coefficient. Referring to [24,32], we assume that when the level of logistic-service intelligence is y, the cost invested by the LSP is gy 2 /2, indicating that it is more and more difficult to stimulate the market with the increase in intelligence level.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(3) When enterprises make optimal decisions, in addition to considering the impact of consumers' wisdom preferences on demand, they should also pay attention to the impact of prices on demand and formulate reasonable logistics-service prices so as to gain the market initiative. In addition, our research also has some theoretical contributions, which are as follows: Firstly, existing articles on the intelligent transformation of logistics services rarely consider the situation of capital constraint [24,32,34]; although Conclusion (1) and Conclusion (2) are similar to those in Ref. [34], the difference is that the equilibrium-decision results are different, and our research on intelligent-transformation decision-making regarding logistics services under capital constraint has realized the extension of the existing theoretical research dimension.…”

Section: Key Findings and Managerial Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Coordination Decision-Making for Intelligent Transformation of Logistics Services under Capital Constraint

et al. 2023

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The intelligent transformation of logistics plays a significant role in meeting the diverse needs of customers, improving operational efficiency, and reducing carbon emissions in logistics activities. Therefore, to achieve sustainable development, logistics enterprises need to face the decision-making problem of intelligent logistics transformation. In this paper, we construct a Stackelberg game model between a financially constrained logistics-service provider (LSP) and a well-funded logistics-service integrator (LSI) and discuss the impact of the wholesale price contract, the cost-sharing contract, the revenue-sharing contract, the two-part tariff contract, and the hybrid cost-sharing and revenue-sharing contract on the intelligence level of logistics services, the profits of supply-chain members, and the channel for logistics-service demand. We found that the cost-sharing contract and the revenue-sharing contract cannot achieve Pareto improvement in the profits of supply-chain members. In addition, the increase in bank-loan interest rates would seriously weaken the level of intelligence and market demand for the entire logistics service. However, when consumers do not have high requirements for the intelligence of logistics services, the two-part power–price contract can create a win–win situation for supply-chain members and increase market demand within a certain range; on the contrary, a hybrid contract of cost sharing and revenue sharing is the best choice. Moreover, in the process of contract design for the intelligent transformation of logistics services, it is necessary to pay attention to the influence of the price-sensitivity coefficient on decision-making.

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Section: Literature Reviewsupporting

confidence: 61%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Key Findings and Managerial Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Coordination Decision-Making for Intelligent Transformation of Logistics Services under Capital Constraint

et al. 2023

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Smart transition pathways and development incentive mechanism of China’s smart community elderly care industry under market dominance: Considering a multi-subjective behavior game

Mao,

Sun

et al. 2024

PLoS ONE

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Against the backdrop of an aging population, China is actively experimenting with an innovative elderly care model, so smart community elderly care has recently received widespread attention. However, the results of the implementation of the model have not yet met the expectation due to the variety of interests among the relevant participants. In this study, we identified the most core stakeholders in smart community elderly care, developed a four-party evolutionary game model including local governments, communities, service supply enterprises and households with elderly members. By applying the system dynamics method, we simulate the evolutionary paths and explore the complex interactions at the multiparticipant level in order to facilitate the transition of community elderly care services from traditional to smart, and then propose managerial insights for accelerating the construction of smart community elderly care. The results suggest that: (1) the four players in the game influence each other and are intimately related, and the benign interaction between them will further stimulate the vitality of the smart community elderly care industry; (2) appropriate improvement in policy support will strongly promote smart community elderly care, and the incentive effect on the demand side (households with elderly members) is more significant; (3) when households’ preference for smart services increases, and the perceived value to communities and enterprises reaches a certain threshold, communities and enterprises will actively adopt smart solution and technology as well as develop stable portfolio strategy; (4) measures such as simultaneously increasing the level of smart and resource synergy will promote the system evolution toward smart services, and the system is more sensitive to the internal behavior of the enterprise than the external behavior between community and enterprise.

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Research on the Emission Reduction Decision of Cost-Sharing Logistics Service Supply Chain in the O2O Model

Zhang

Wang²,

Kang³

2022

Sustainability

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As an effective way to realize energy savings and environmental protection, cost sharing is gradually becoming an important measure to reduce emissions in the logistics service supply chain under O2O mode in recent years. How to conduct contract selection and design optimization under the cost-sharing situation, and then improve the operational efficiency of the logistics service supply chain is an important issue that needs to be addressed. Firstly, based on the initial market demand for logistics, this paper involves the influence of both online logistics service integrators and onsite functional logistics service providers on logistics market demand in terms of emission reduction and platform brand image and develops a model based on the logistics service demand function in the O2O mode. Secondly, for the role of online and onsite emission reduction services in multi-cycle continuous cooperation to enhance the platform integrator’s brand image, a cost-sharing differential game model between online and onsite services is developed to facilitate providers’ adoption of high-quality emission reduction services. Finally, the HJB equation is used to compare the non-cooperative Nash game, the cost-sharing Stackelberg game, and the cooperative game to make the optimal abatement decision, the optimal benefit, and the cost-sharing ratio of the abatement service supply chain in the non-cooperative Nash game, the cost-sharing Stackelberg game, and the cooperative game. By comparing the results of the three games, we find that the optimal onsite and online abatement service decision is related to the cost, marginal revenue, and the impact of the service on demand; the abatement cost-sharing contract and cooperation are both better than the non-cooperative independent decision state, which can effectively guide the provision of high-quality onsite abatement service and improve the revenue of both parties involved in the logistics service supply chain and the total system’s revenue in the O2O mode. Compared with the cooperative game model, the cost-sharing contract can more effectively facilitate close cooperation between the actors, and the relationship between onsite and online marginal revenue affects the improvement of both parties’ revenue. The findings of the study can provide useful managerial insights for the selection and design optimization of abatement contracts for logistics service supply chains considering cost-sharing via the O2O model.

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Contract Design of Logistics Service Supply Chain Based on Smart Transformation

Cited by 5 publications

References 47 publications

Coordination Decision-Making for Intelligent Transformation of Logistics Services under Capital Constraint

Coordination Decision-Making for Intelligent Transformation of Logistics Services under Capital Constraint

Smart transition pathways and development incentive mechanism of China’s smart community elderly care industry under market dominance: Considering a multi-subjective behavior game

Research on the Emission Reduction Decision of Cost-Sharing Logistics Service Supply Chain in the O2O Model

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