Contrasting contributions of movement onset and duration to self‐evaluation of sensorimotor timing performance

Abstract

Movement execution is not always optimal. Understanding how humans evaluate their own motor decisions can give us insights into their suboptimality. Here, we investigated how humans time the action of synchronizing an arm movement with a predictable visual event and how well they can evaluate the outcome of this action. On each trial, participants had to decide when to start (reaction time) and for how long to move (movement duration) to reach a target on time. After each trial, participants judged the confidence they had that their performance on that trial was better than average. We found that participants mostly varied their reaction time, keeping the average movement duration short and relatively constant across conditions. Interestingly, confidence judgements reflected deviations from the planned reaction time and were not related to planned movement duration. In two other experiments, we replicated these results in conditions where the contribution of sensory uncertainty was reduced. In contrast to confidence judgements, when asked to make an explicit estimation of their temporal error, participants' estimates were related in a similar manner to both reaction time and movement duration. In summary, humans control the timing of their actions primarily by adjusting the delay to initiate the action, and they estimate their confidence in their action from the difference between the planned and executed movement onset. Our results highlight the critical role of the internal model for the self‐evaluation of one's motor performance.

Towards a common conceptual space for metacognition in perception and memory

“…the movement duration) than others (e.g. when they initiated the movement; 223 ). Finally, studying motor metacognition is also of interest regarding the distinction between the monitoring of internal (e.g., mnesic) and external (e.g., sensory) signals, as both efferent and reafferent signals might serve as objects for meta-representations.…”