Contrasting First- and Second-Order Electoral Behaviour: Determinants of Individual Party Choice in European and German Federal Elections

Giebler, Heiko; Wagner, Aiko

doi:10.1080/09644008.2014.949684

Cited by 25 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…It is expected that when voters like multiple parties or are not strongly attached to just one party, they might vote for different parties in different elections (here: regional and European) in order to express their support for different parties. This is also seen as 'balancing' between different preferences and positions (Giebler & Wagner, 2015). On the one hand, this can be measured by vote switching between the election that took place during the study, and the most recent previous election.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Looking for the European Voter: Split-Ticket Voting in the Belgian Regional and European Elections of 2009 and 2014

Kelbel

Ingelgom

Verhaegen

2016

PaG

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While European elections are often seen as remote from EU issues, considerations specifically linked to the EU came to the forefront in the wake of the 2014 European elections: the economic and financial crisis, the new process of designation of the European Commission President, and the alleged increase of Eurosceptic votes. This increased salience of political debates about the EU asks for a reconsideration of the 'second-order nature' of European elections. In this context, as in 2009, the Belgian electorate voted for the regional and European levels on the very same day. Belgian voters were thus offered the opportunity to split their ticket between both levels. This allows comparing the occurrence and determinants of these 'immediate switching' behaviours in 2014 with those of the presumably less politicized EP elections in 2009. We do that by employing the 2009 and 2014 PartiRep Election Study data. On the one hand, the article shows that split-ticket voting cannot be explained by economic voting, European identity, and attitudes towards integration in 2014. On the other hand, the unique configuration of the Belgian elections enables us to observe that the introduction of Spitzenkandidaten did enhance split-ticket voting for voters who could directly vote for this candidate (in Flanders), while this did not increase split-ticket voting among voters who could only indirectly support the candidate (in Wallonia).

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Looking for the European Voter: Split-Ticket Voting in the Belgian Regional and European Elections of 2009 and 2014

Kelbel

Ingelgom

Verhaegen

2016

PaG

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“…Regarding electoral competition, voice is the most harmful option for ruling parties while the harmfulness of exit depends more on the overall mobilization levels. Differentiating between both forms of disloyalty does not only help us to determine the harmfulness, it also speaks to more refined perspectives on second-order elections located on the microlevel which link turnout and party choice to determine and explain vote share differences (e.g., Rohrschneider and Clark, 2008;Weber, 2011;Giebler, 2014;Giebler and Wagner, 2015;Boomgaarden et al, 2016).…”

Section: Information Media Priming and Government Evaluationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Priming Europe: Media effects on loyalty, voice and exit in European Parliament elections

et al. 2016

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Abstract:Parties in government face a decline in EP elections after experiencing a surge in votes to win the national election. This occurs because voters are more inclined to give voice to their dissatisfaction with current government performance by voting for the opposition or exiting because less is at stake in second-order elections. These elections negatively affect the electoral fortunes of governing parties as voters opt to punish poorly performing national governments in EP elections. Meanwhile, greater reliance on the EU issue dimension in vote choice models is taken as evidence for the increasing Europeanisation of EP elections. We examine the role of the media in making the EU issue dimension salient in such a way that government parties may benefit electorally from this increased saliency. To examine whether visibility of government party actors in media coverage increases loyalty for the governing parties either directly or via priming the EU issues for voters, we combine survey data from the 2009 European Election Studies (EES) with data on news coverage of those elections that links the governing party to the EU issue. We show that where the government is visible in EU news coverage, EU issue voting tends to increase loyalty while decreasing the probability to vote for the opposition and thus improves the electoral prospects for governing parties. This is even more the case if the issue is primed by negative campaign coverage.1

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“…In the third wave of the panel survey, which was fielded in April 2014, i.e. one month prior to Election Day, we asked respondents to indicate their preferences for the three main Spitzenkandi-1 However, research on individual-level voter behaviour also suggests that strategic considerations play a role as well (e.g., Boomgaarden, Johann, & Kritzinger, 2016;Carrubba & Timpone, 2005;Clark & Rohrschneider, 2009;Giebler & Wagner, 2015). 2 See the EP's resolution of 22 November 2012(2012/2829).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluations of the Spitzenkandidaten: The Role of Information and News Exposure in Citizens’ Preference Formation

Gattermann

Vreese

Brug

2016

PaG

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The 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections were characterised by a novel element in European Union (EU) politics. For the first time, the major European party families put forward top candidates for President of the European Commission, the so-called Spitzenkandidaten. This paper tests whether this innovation had the potential to-at least partiallyalleviate the alleged accountability deficit. We rely on original survey data to assess citizens' preferences for each of the main Spitzenkandidaten: Jean-Claude Juncker, Martin Schulz, and Guy Verhofstadt. Our research is guided by three questions: what explains whether citizens formulate a preference for a certain Spitzenkandidat? Which factors are responsible for variations in such preferences? And, are these explanations moderated by citizens' political awareness? We show that three factors enable citizens to formulate a preference for the Spitzenkandidaten: news exposure, general EU political information, and campaign-specific information about the Spitzenkandidaten. Furthermore, we demonstrate that only the most knowledgeable citizens are able to use party cues in their evaluations of the Spitzenkandidaten. The implications of our findings are discussed with reference to the EU's democratic deficit debate.

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Contrasting First- and Second-Order Electoral Behaviour: Determinants of Individual Party Choice in European and German Federal Elections

Cited by 25 publications

References 18 publications

Looking for the European Voter: Split-Ticket Voting in the Belgian Regional and European Elections of 2009 and 2014

Looking for the European Voter: Split-Ticket Voting in the Belgian Regional and European Elections of 2009 and 2014

Priming Europe: Media effects on loyalty, voice and exit in European Parliament elections

Evaluations of the Spitzenkandidaten: The Role of Information and News Exposure in Citizens’ Preference Formation

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