Contrived Competition: Economic Regulation and Deregulation, 1920s–1980s

Getting back to scenario planning: Strategic action in the future of energy Europe

“…In several cases, like in the energy sector, there do however still exist, and have always existed, important strings attached towards industry from governments. This could be about ownership, new regulations being set up, control of capital needed etc [99], [100], [101]. This mean that policy action still has a huge impact on the energy system, but not the same way as during regulated times [102].…”

“…At EU-level as whole it started around 2001 -2003, and still is ongoing [114]. In countries like USA the process of deregulation started earlier [99], [101]. By that it could also be claimed the pattern of publications to follow the deregulation process.…”

Combining New Institutionalisms: Explaining Institutional Change in American Property Insurance

“…Moreover, institutional solutions can create new relationships, interests, and capacities for learning and strategic behavior, empowering new actors and channeling competition and resource use in dysfunctional ways (Noll and Owen, 1983;Vietor, 1994). For example, U.S. mass producers used the vertically integrated corporation to solve exchange problems they faced with suppliers and distributors (Chandler, 1977;Williamson, 1975).…”

“…As documented above, the weight of existing institutions make incremental rather than fundamental change the most likely result of failure or controversy. Institutions create sunk costs and vested interests (North, 1990;Vietor, 1994), veto points for those threatened by new solutions (Immergut, 1992), and mechanisms for shifting the costs of failures onto unorganized groups (Wilson, 1980). They also enact theories or cognitive schemes that can obscure the significance of problems, render alternatives irrational, and bound rationality within extant problem-solving routines (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983;Dobbin, 1994;Oliver, 1992).…”

The political economy of international regulatory convergence in public utilities

“…Public utilities where competitive entry is feasible are characterised by heavy lobbying activities both by incumbents (including their employees, who benefit from rents if the regulatory status quo is maintained) and by new entrants (especially multinational groups trying to benefit from the assets and experience accumulated elsewhere, which tend to push regulation towards the imitation of practices that have been successful in other countries) (Bonardi, 2004;Campbell, 1994;Cawson et al, 1990;Teske, 1991;Vietor, 1994). 3 When these (often) opposed influences on policy-making are taken into account, regulations tend to display features that are neither full imitations of best practices nor full rejection of them, but experiment by combining some elements of each.…”