The political economy of international regulatory convergence in public utilities

Bonardi, Jean Philippe; Urbiztondo, Santiago; Quélin, Bertrand

doi:10.1504/ijmne.2009.024786

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 39 publications

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“…The underlying assumption here is that former monopolies that have lost largest market shares are those that have faced the most hostile regulatory environment, favouring new entrants to the detriment of incumbents. Up to a recent period (and because of technological breakthroughs in wireless telecom), it was indeed very difficult for new entrants to expand without significant intervention from regulatory authorities (Bonardi et al, 2009). 4.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

International Expansion, Diversification and Regulated Firm Nonmarket Strategy

Urbiztondo¹,

Bonardi

Quélin

2012

Manage Decis Econ

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Previous studies have shown that regulated firms diversify for reasons that are different than for unregulated firms. We explore some of these differences by providing a theoretical model that starts by considering the firm-regulator relationship as an incomplete information issue, in which a regulated incumbent has knowledge that the regulator does not have, but the firm cannot convey hard information about this knowledge. The incumbent faces both market and nonmarket competition from a new entrant. In that context, we show that when the firm faces tough nonmarket competition domestically, going abroad can create a mechanism that makes information transmission to the regulator more credible. International expansion can thus be a way to solve domestic nonmarket issues in addition to being a catalyst for growth.

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Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%