International Expansion, Diversification and Regulated Firm Nonmarket Strategy

Urbiztondo, Santiago; Bonardi, Jean-Philippe; Quélin, Bertrand

doi:10.1002/mde.2598

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 51 publications

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“…For example, if a firm innovates some new technologies for reducing environmental pollution, it should lobby its government to enhance the stringency of regulations so as to gain an advantage over its competitors who do not have such advanced 'green technologies' (Capron and Chatain 2008;urbiztondo, Bonardi, and Quélin 2013). Thus, this IVS is created to characterize a firm's nonmarket strategies that will be influenced by its market strategies.…”

Section: Nonmarket and Market Components: An Ivsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Integrating nonmarket and market resources, strategy and performance in Chinese enterprises: a review of the field and a resource-based empirical study

Wei

Zhao

et al. 2015

Asia Pacific Business Review

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Section: Nonmarket and Market Components: An Ivsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Integrating nonmarket and market resources, strategy and performance in Chinese enterprises: a review of the field and a resource-based empirical study

Wei

Zhao

et al. 2015

Asia Pacific Business Review

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“…In the literature the corporate political strategies are often based on the form and intensity of actions and activities (Urbitzondo et al, 2009;De Figuereido and Tiller, 2001;Van den Bergh, 2002, 2004;Keim and Zeithaml, 1986;Schuler, 1996;Schuler et al, 2002). For instance, Hillman and Hitt (1999) differentiate between two fundamental approaches: the relational and the transactional corporate political strategic approaches.…”

Section: Corporate Political Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Political Strategies Related to Decisions of European Competition Commission on Regulatory Issues in the European Telecommunications Industry

Kranenburg¹,

Ross

2014

Journal of Media Business Studies

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The European regulatory institution has the tasks to protect fair competition and equal opportunities for all companies in the European telecommunications industry and to protect the welfare of the consumers. This regulator is responsible for the adherence of telecommunications companies to competition rules. It can oblige companies to change their behavior and follow the new rules of the game, and it can also sanction telecommunications companies which have abused their market power. These telecommunications companies can decide to comply with the decision or they can response actively to the decision of a sanction. These decisions and responses are part of their corporate political strategies. This study aims to explore and provide more conclusive empirical evidence with regard to the corporate political strategies used by telecommunications companies to influence issues and decisions in their political and regulatory environment. This study analyzes how five large former state owned companies in the European telecommunications industry responded to the decisions of the European regulator, the European Competition Commission, on regulatory issues. The evidence shows that when the European regulator decided to sanction the companies with a fine for a regulatory issue, the companies responded with a recalcitrant corporate political strategy. However, when the regulator obliged the companies to adapt or change their behavior, then the companies responded with a responsive corporate political strategy.

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“…In Figure 1, Urbiztondo et al (2013) states that OTE has no foreign operations, when its mobile arm COSMOTE was present in the Balkans; similarly the African operations of Portugal Telecom are omitted, while Telenor apparently only had two foreign networks; BT had 58, which can only be fixed networks supporting its business customers.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Lobbying and litigation in telecommunications markets – reapplying Porter’s five forces

Sutherland

2014

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to consider extending the Porter “five forces” model for business strategy to encompass nonmarket actions in the telecommunications sector. Design/methodology/approach – The Porter five forces model is reviewed in terms of a heavily regulated sector, examining each force in turn, with examples of the use by market players of lobbying and litigation to affect market outcomes. Findings – The “five forces” model is a useful tool in analysing advocacy, lobbying and litigation by players in a heavily regulated market. Practical implications – The extension opens the way to research in a number of areas to examine issues of structure and strategy, effectiveness in coupling market and nonmarket strategies. Originality/value – Business strategy is infrequently analysed in the telecommunications sector and only rarely considers lobbying and litigation. This article provides a framework for such analyses and opens up new areas of research.

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International Expansion, Diversification and Regulated Firm Nonmarket Strategy

Cited by 6 publications

References 51 publications

Integrating nonmarket and market resources, strategy and performance in Chinese enterprises: a review of the field and a resource-based empirical study

Integrating nonmarket and market resources, strategy and performance in Chinese enterprises: a review of the field and a resource-based empirical study

Corporate Political Strategies Related to Decisions of European Competition Commission on Regulatory Issues in the European Telecommunications Industry

Lobbying and litigation in telecommunications markets – reapplying Porter’s five forces

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