Controllability and hindsight components: Understanding opposite hindsight biases for self-relevant negative event outcomes

Abstract

There is an anomaly in the hindsight bias literature with respect to hindsight effects obtained after self-relevant negative event outcomes: Whereas some studies have reported reduced hindsight bias, others have shown increases. This article contrasts two explanations for the anomaly. The first points to an influence of perceived control over the event outcome: In hindsight, people decrease foreseeability (and hence, responsibility and blame) for controllable events, but they increase the perceived inevitability of uncontrollable events for coping reasons. The second explanation, derived from a reconception of hindsight bias in terms of separate components (Blank, Nestler, von Collani, & Fischer, 2008), traces the anomaly to differences in the observed hindsight components: Hindsight decreases are to be expected for foreseeability, whereas increases are restricted to the inevitability component. Our experiment (N 210) manipulated controllability and the hindsight component orthogonally and showed strong support for the component explanation, but also some influence of perceived control.

Misreporting signs of child abuse: The role of decision‐making and outcome information

“…The finding adds to a large literature showing schema‐consistent intrusion errors in memory (e.g., Alba & Hasher, ), but suggests at the same time the somewhat counterintuitive conclusion that people may under some circumstances misremember details in a way that undermines their ability to present their past decisions as reasonable (cf. Blank & Peters, ).…”

Hindsight Bias: A Primer for Motivational Researchers

“…Blank and his colleagues (Blank & Nestler, 2006; Blank & Peters, 2010; Nestler, Blank, & Egloff, 2010) suggest hindsight bias can be measured via one of three different and independent ‘components’: inevitability, foreseeability, and memory distortions. For example, Blank and Peters (2010) replicated the typical self‐blame avoidance findings (Louie, 1999; Mark & Mellor, 1991) using a foreseeability measure, but replicated the retroactive pessimism findings of Tykocinski (2001; Tykocinski et al., 2002) when they used an inevitability measure. The concept of hindsight components is appealing, but the method in which Blank and his colleagues measure them is sometimes confusing – at least to me.…”

Complexity in simulation-based education: exploring the role of hindsight bias

“…Hindsight bias can be defined as the tendency to overestimate the foreseeability, inevitability, or likelihood of outcomes after they become manifest and known [ 1 , 2 ]. This can systematically influence perceptions of past events [ 1 , 2 ], and therefore potentially the processes of reflection, debriefing, and learning.…”

“…Hindsight bias can be defined as the tendency to overestimate the foreseeability, inevitability, or likelihood of outcomes after they become manifest and known [ 1 , 2 ]. This can systematically influence perceptions of past events [ 1 , 2 ], and therefore potentially the processes of reflection, debriefing, and learning. Debriefing that includes a deliberate re-examination of simulation experiences is established practice [ 3 – 6 ], and studies have investigated methods of promoting learners’ reflections [ 7 , 8 ].…”