Convention Emergence with Congested Resources

Levy, Priel; Griffiths, Nathan

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-82254-5_8

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Tilman, Plotkin and Akc ¸ay (2020) suggest that the joint dynamics of strategies and the environment rely (i) on the incentives for individuals to lead or follow behavioral changes, and (ii) on the relative speed of environmental versus strategic change. Levy and Griffiths (2021) propose a framework where agents' reward exogenously depend on the strategy of others and the environment, enabling the emergence of social norms. While environmental feedback has recently received increasing interest, it has never been explored in the co-presence with punishment.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Emergence of Punishment in Social Dilemma with Environmental Feedback

Wang

Song

Shen

et al. 2023

AAAI

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Altruistic punishment (or punishment) has been extensively shown as an important mechanism for promoting cooperation in human societies. In AI, the emergence of punishment has received much recent interest. In this paper, we contribute with a novel evolutionary game theoretic model to study the impacts of environmental feedback. Whereas a population of agents plays public goods games, there exists a third-party population whose payoffs depend not only on whether to punish or not, but also on the state of the environment (e.g., how cooperative the agents in a social dilemma are). Focusing on one-shot public goods games, we show that environmental feedback, by itself, can lead to the emergence of punishment. We analyze the co-evolution of punishment and cooperation, and derive conditions for their co-presence, co-dominance and co-extinction. Moreover, we show that the system can exhibit bistability as well as cyclic dynamics. Our findings provide a new explanation for the emergence of punishment. On the other hand, our results also alert the need for careful design of implementing punishment in multi-agent systems, as the resulting evolutionary dynamics can be somewhat complex.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%