Conventional Counterforce Dilemmas: South Korea's Deterrence Strategy and Stability on the Korean Peninsula

Abstract

In response to North Korea's nuclear weapons program, South Korea is quietly pursuing an independent conventional counterforce and countervalue strategy. This strategy is unique. Few, if any, nonnuclear states have sought to rely on advanced conventional capabilities to deter a nuclear-armed adversary. Why is South Korea pursuing a conventional counterforce and countervalue strategy, and what could its impact be on strategic stability on the Korean Peninsula? South Korea's approach should be understood as both a short- and long-term hedge against U.S. abandonment. Its deterrent effect, no matter how uncertain, acts as a short-term stopgap if the United States abandons South Korea. Over the long term, capabilities such as advanced ballistic and cruise missiles bolster South Korea's nuclear latency. At the same time, we highlight that the strategy poses numerous technological and operational difficulties and has negative implications for arms race and crisis stability. Given South Korea's approach and North Korea's response, disarmament efforts focused purely on the bilateral U.S.–North Korea relationship will not succeed. Rather, any agreement will now need to address the growing gap in the conventional balance of forces on the Korean Peninsula.

Hacking Nuclear Stability: Wargaming Technology, Uncertainty, and Escalation

“…The most concerning campaign plans were those that discussed automation, a "dead hand," or predelegation in response to cyber vulnerabilities-perhaps best illustrated by one survey explanation of how cyber vulnerabilities affected their crisis response 107. Bowers and Hiim 2021;Clary and Narang 2019;Lieber and Press 2017;Long and Green 2015 plan: that they "incentivized devolution and autonomy of nuclear command. Incentivized de-digitization and movement to analogue NC2."…”

Disuasión en la península de Corea: factor para la estabilidad regional y mundial

“…En agosto de 2020, el ministro de Defensa de Corea del Sur reveló que su país ha desarrollado de manera exitosa misiles balísticos con suficiente alcance y con una de las mayores capacidades para proteger la paz en la península de Corea (Bowers & Hiim, 2021b), contrafuerza convencional y contravalor estratégico, pensada en contener la infraestructura de armamento nuclear de Corea del Norte, independientemente de los EE. UU.…”

‘I know something you don’t know’: The asymmetry of ‘strategic intelligence’ and the great perils of asymmetric alliances

“…Given that intelligence capability is critical for a state’s strategies and war plans, South Korea is highly dependent on the United States for the Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) and the Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) concerning North Korea’s threat. 10 Traditionally, South Korea has relied on the United States for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities (Bowers and Hiim, 2020/21: 8). Currently, over 85% of SIGINT and IMINT on North Korea comes from the United States’ high-tech satellites or facilities (Hankook Ilbo, 2016).…”

“…Thus, Seoul has developed a plan to introduce four synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites and one optic-infrared satellite by 2022 (Park and Yun, 2016). Recently, South Korea has achieved four US-made Global Hawk high altitude long endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and it is procuring KOMPSAT-6 and KOMPSAT-7 satellites for improved high-resolution coverage (Bowers and Hiim, 2020/21: 23). As South Korea has developed independent, high-technology ISR capabilities against North Korea, it will be less dependent on the United States’ strategic intelligence and may retain more influence over the United States.…”