Convincing Legislators with Performance Measures

Abstract

This study uses an analysis of public managers' own words to increase legislative use of performance measures in budgeting. Using data from a survey designed from a content analysis of local administrators' descriptions of effective approaches, it shows that high quality budget analysis, political consideration, and effective communication can increase the chances for effective performance-based legislative funding. The findings can help managers effectively prepare and present their performancebased budget requests. The findings also speak to budgetary decision-making theory.

Performance Management in Government Internal Audits: Critical Success Factors

“…This finding appears consistent with the argument of Wang (2008) that legislators will use performance measures in funding decisions only under certain conditions, such as high quality measures clearly linked to program or activity service goals.…”

“…Wang (2008) found that legislators will use performance measures in funding decisions only under certain conditions, such as high quality measures clearly linked to program or activity service goals, specific allocation decision and the demonstration of plausible linkages between funding decision and actual performance. In a survey of Federal agency managers, the GAO (2008) found that the use of performance information for allocating resources, setting program priorities, and other managerial decisions was not significantly different between 1997 and 2007, even though more performance measures were available in the latter years.…”

The Use of Performance Information in Budgetary Decision‐making by Legislators: Is Estonia Any Different?

“…Based on some versions of the agency theory, one can argue that legislators would seek to alleviate their informational disadvantages vis‐à‐vis the executive branch via talking to officials (and also fellow legislators) rather than reading formal written performance reports (see, e.g., Ter Bogt 2001, 2004; Pollitt 2006a; Bourdeaux 2008). Furthermore, since PI is usually compiled by the very ministries and agencies about whom the politicians would like to get information, they may not trust it and would hence be reluctant to apply it when making resource allocation decisions (Bourdeaux 2008; Wang 2008). Alongside the considerations of the reliability of the PI provided, one should keep in mind that if PI is inserted as additional data to budgetary process, the legislators may face cognitive overload with regard to the amount of information they have to process (Curristine 2005a, p. 145; Bourdeaux 2008, p. 549; Gomez and Willoughby 2008, p. 300).…”

“…There are a number of empirical studies that explore the effects of PI on legislative decision‐making in general (for overviews of the literature, see, e.g., Jordan and Hackbart 1999; Frank and D’Souza 2004), and several studies that have looked at the utilization of PI in budgetary decision‐making in the executive branch (for recent overviews of studies, see, e.g., Jordan and Hackbart 1999; Melkers and Willoughby 2005; Gomez and Willoughby 2008; Zaltsman 2009; Ho 2011). However, there is very little research exploring empirically the question of whether and how legislators employ PI in budgetary decision‐making; among the studies that have been undertaken, the focus has been either on the local government level (Melkers and Willoughby 2001; Wang 2008) or state level (Willoughby and Melkers 2000, 2001; Bourdeaux 2008), rather than on national governments. It is important to keep in mind that even though PI may be used by the executive branch, this does not automatically carry over to legislative arenas (Melkers and Willoughby 2001; Zaltsman 2009).…”

Assessing the Impact of Performance‐Based Budgeting: A Comparative Analysis across the United States, Taiwan, and China

“…It is important to note that budgeting is essentially a political process, and spending decisions represent a compromise between diversified political powers. Performance information, even if used in making spending decisions, is likely adopted to advance the value of a political agenda in the budgeting process (Joyce 1993; Wang 2008). There is some evidence to show the impact of PBB on budgetary decision‐making capabilities and behaviors (Jordan and Hackbart 1999; Lee and Burns 2000; Willoughby and Melkers 2000).…”