Cooperation in Groups of Different Sizes: The Effects of Punishment and Reputation-Based Partner Choice

Abstract

Reputation and punishment are two distinct mechanisms that facilitate cooperation among strangers. However, empirical research on their effectiveness is mainly limited to relatively small groups and does not address how they enhance cooperation in relatively larger groups. We address this gap in the literature by testing hypotheses from competing perspectives about the extent to which reputation-based partner choice and punishment enhance cooperation in both small and large groups. Prior work recognizes that an increase in group size is accompanied by a change in the incentive structure, which determines whether the temptation (extra benefit for each person from noncooperation over cooperation, regardless of others' choices) or gain (extra benefit for each person from full cooperation over full non-cooperation) remains constant or varies with group size. Thus, we first test how group size affects cooperation when temptation or gain increases with group size (Study 1), and then move on to testing predictions on the effectiveness of reputation and punishment across different group sizes (Study 2). In Study 1 (N = 820), we randomly assigned participants to play an online one-shot public goods game in groups of 4, 20, or 40, while keeping the marginal group return or marginal per capita return fixed across groups, in which case the temptation or gain increased with group size. In Study 2 (N = 1,132), we further compared a public goods situation involving a punishment or reputation mechanism with an anonymous situation across group sizes, while the marginal group return was fixed across groups. Overall, we found that when temptation increased with group size, 20-person groups cooperated significantly less than 4-person groups in one-shot interactions, and that this effect was explained by lower expectation of others' cooperation, less perceived collective efficacy, and greater perceived conflict. However, 40-person and 4-person groups did not vary in one-shot cooperation. Importantly, reputation-based partner choice and punishment invariably promoted one-shot cooperation in groups of different sizes. These findings suggest no simple effect of group size on cooperation and underscore the utility of reputation and punishment in fostering cooperation (at least in one-shot interactions) regardless of the size of groups.

Having a stake in the future and perceived population density influence intergenerational cooperation

“…The people-chatting sound is known to invoke feelings of high population density [33], which typically indicates that a large group of people are sharing the same resources. It is known that increasing group size makes cooperation more difficult to achieve and a shared resource less likely to be sustained [26][27][28]57,58]. Therefore, if the motivation for cooperation is focused on a material payoff that is contingent on the resource being sustained (i.e.…”

“…conspicuous green consumption) [17,[23][24][25]. On the other hand, cooperation in social dilemmas typically decreases with the number of participants, even when a reputation effect is included [26], in part due to greater perceived conflict and lower perceived efficacy [27,28]. A field study also showed that urban residents depleted resources more quickly than rural residents in a dynamic common-pool resource game [29].…”

Increasing resolution in the mechanisms of resolve

“…Here is one possible trajectory. The human species arrives and thrives on the strength of hypertrophied capacities for cooperation and culture, central to which are enhanced mechanisms for reputation tracking (Santos, Rankin, & Wedekind, 2011), social prediction (Frith & Frith, 2006), and normative forms of conformity and enforcement (Kelly & Setman, 2020;Wu, Balliet, Peperkoorn, Romano, & Lange, 2019). These initially outward-oriented social mechanismssome of which may themselves have culturally evolved and been socially acquired (Heyes, 2018) are reoriented Putting the pieces together: Self-control as a complex interaction of psychological processes Fritz Strack, Roland Deutsch and Bleen Abraham Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg, Lehrstuhl für Psychologie II, D-97070 Würzburg, Germany.…”

Gift Game Metatheory: Social Interaction and Interpersonal Growth

“…This seems theoretically impossible insofar as punishment is the mechanism for avoiding defection precisely when trust is impossible, such that it is not a valid substitute for trust whether in big or small organizations. A recent empirical study shows that punishment only guarantees trust and reciprocity in one-shot interactions ( Wu et al, 2020 ). A meta-analysis across 18 societies clearly concluded that the effectiveness of punishment in promoting cooperation depends on the level of trust ( Balliet and Van Lange, 2013 ).…”