Cooperation in stochastic games: a prisoner’s dilemma experiment

Kloosterman, Andrew

doi:10.1007/s10683-019-09619-w

Cited by 11 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Importantly, both of these channels, increased own benefits from cooperation and an increased belief that one's opponent plays cooperatively, work in the same direction. The same is true in the two articles on Markov games that discuss the basin of attraction (Vespa and Wilson ; Kloosterman ) and these articles also do not consider the distribution of beliefs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 88%

“…The experiment fits into the growing literature on infinite horizon games in the laboratory. However, just a few experiments consider Markov games (Charness and Genicot ; Rojas ; Ruffle ; Cabral et al ; Roy ; Vespa and Wilson ; Kloosterman ). Cabral et al () and Roy () consider favor‐trading games that, on their face, appear similar to the asymmetric partnership game because they entail taking costly actions to give a benefit to others.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This means the games are not coordination games and thus the basin of attraction argument does not apply. Many of the other articles are stochastic versions of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma (Rojas ; Ruffle ; Vespa and Wilson and Kloosterman ), for which the basin of attraction applies, although, in addition to being a different game, the adaptation is unnecessary to interpret results. Vespa () and Sherstyuk et al () also investigate Markov games, though the stochastic process is a function of the actions of players rather than the exogenous stochastic process considered here, and thus the questions they consider are quite different.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Vespa () and Kloosterman () do try to infer entire strategies using this method in different stochastic games. Vespa starts with an enormous set of possible strategies, while Kloosterman has a simpler game.…”

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confidence: 99%

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An Experimental Study of Public Information in the Asymmetric Partnership Game

Kloosterman¹

2018

Southern Economic Journal

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This article analyzes a laboratory experiment on the novel asymmetric partnership game with public information. In this game, two players jointly work on a project each period that only benefits one of them. The public signals are about who is likely to benefit in the future, and the main treatment variable is the informativeness of these signals. Behavior is shown to be best explained by a modification of the basin of attraction (as introduced in Dal Bó and Fréchette 2011) to allow for state-dependent beliefs. The public signals impact choices in the way that this theory predicts, and ultimately there is more effort when signals are more informative. Finally, a new way to investigate strategies in these types of games is considered, and it is shown that different states are used by subjects to use partial effort strategies.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 88%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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An Experimental Study of Public Information in the Asymmetric Partnership Game

Kloosterman¹

2018

Southern Economic Journal

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“…Defection in the stage game with highest payoffs drives play subsequently to the stage game with lowest payoffs such that deviating from cooperation at that point leads to lower payoffs in the four-state relative to the two-state treatment.5 Vespa and Wilson (2017) also find that whether the rewards to joint cooperation are immediate or operate only through the transition by increasing future payoffs may also play a role in the selection of efficient SPEs. For related work, see alsoKloosterman (2019), who studies a stochastic prisoner's dilemma andWilson and Vespa (2019), who study the effect of preplay communication in a dynamic cheap-talk game.…”

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confidence: 99%

An Experimental Investigation of Cooperation in the Dynamic Common Pool Game

Vespa¹

2020

Int Economic Review

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This article studies experimentally to what extent subjects can cooperate in a dynamic common pool game, where the stage game changes endogenously. Although efficiency can be supported with strategies that condition on history, the main finding is that it is difficult to cooperate. Even if the incentives to cooperate are large, modal behavior can be rationalized with equilibrium Markov strategies that do not condition on history. The popularity of Markov strategies, however, is decreasing in the incentives to cooperate. The evidence also suggests that strategic uncertainty added by facing stage games that change in time may move play away from efficiency.

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stratEst: a software package for strategy frequency estimation

Dvorak

2023

J Econ Sci Assoc

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AbstractstratEst is a software package for strategy frequency estimation in the freely available statistical computing environment R (R Development Core Team in R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, 2022). The package aims at minimizing the start-up costs of running the modern strategy frequency estimation techniques used in experimental economics. Strategy frequency estimation (Stahl and Wilson in J Econ Behav Organ 25: 309–327, 1994; Stahl and Wilson in Games Econ Behav, 10: 218–254, 1995) models the choices of participants in an economic experiment as a finite-mixture of individual decision strategies. The parameters of the model describe the associated behavior of each strategy and its frequency in the data. stratEst provides a convenient and flexible framework for strategy frequency estimation, allowing the user to customize, store and reuse sets of candidate strategies. The package includes useful functions for data processing and simulation, strategy programming, model estimation, parameter testing, model checking, and model selection.

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Cooperation in stochastic games: a prisoner’s dilemma experiment

Cited by 11 publications

References 21 publications

An Experimental Study of Public Information in the Asymmetric Partnership Game

An Experimental Study of Public Information in the Asymmetric Partnership Game

An Experimental Investigation of Cooperation in the Dynamic Common Pool Game

stratEst: a software package for strategy frequency estimation

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