Cooperation in Stochastic Games: A Prisoner's Dilemma Experiment

Kloosterman, Andrew

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3029579

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 17 publications

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“…A significant amount of prior research in teams and closely related group settings has found a key factor in preventing individuals from pursuing self-interests and resolving these potential conflicts is the ability of members to monitor individual contributions and punish deviations from social norms (Murnighan and Roth, 1983;Carpenter et al, 2009;Dawes, 1980). , Kloosterman (2020) and Murnighan and Roth (1983) make a significant contribution to this research by creating unknown end points, which can make cooperating a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in Prisoner Dilemma games supported by threats of punishment consistent with the Folk Theorem . These studies attribute increases in cooperation to two factors: the existence of subgame perfect equilibrium strategies to cooperate, and the ability of individuals to potentially gain from future cooperation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 92%

Mutual monitoring in multi-period teams: an experimental investigation

Nikias

2021

TPM

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether managers punish more and work harder in teams with peer monitoring when it is less costly to punish in a two-period, one-shot horizon. Design/methodology/approach An experiment is conducted in a two-period horizon with two treatments. The structure of performance measures makes it costless or costly to punish in the second period. Findings The results find punishing, contingent on first-period strategies, was significantly greater when it was costless compared to costly, as expected. Working, which is analogous to cooperating in prisoner dilemma games, was also significantly greater in the first and second periods when punishing was costless. Practical implications This paper is informative about the potential benefits of performance measures in dynamic team environments, which can be challenging and costly to develop. It adds insight into the design of self-discipline and tasks in teams which might help increase productivity. Originality/value This paper is related to the research on indefinite horizons, which attributes increases in cooperation to the existence of subgame perfect strategies to cooperate and potential gains from future cooperation. In comparison, this study examines the effects of the existence of subgame perfect strategies to work in isolation from the potential gains from future interactions. In addition, it examines whether their potential benefits depend on the cost of punishing when punishing is subgame perfect in a one-shot horizon.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 92%

Mutual monitoring in multi-period teams: an experimental investigation

Nikias

2021

TPM

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An Experimental Study of Public Information in the Asymmetric Partnership Game

Kloosterman¹

2018

Southern Economic Journal

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This article analyzes a laboratory experiment on the novel asymmetric partnership game with public information. In this game, two players jointly work on a project each period that only benefits one of them. The public signals are about who is likely to benefit in the future, and the main treatment variable is the informativeness of these signals. Behavior is shown to be best explained by a modification of the basin of attraction (as introduced in Dal Bó and Fréchette 2011) to allow for state-dependent beliefs. The public signals impact choices in the way that this theory predicts, and ultimately there is more effort when signals are more informative. Finally, a new way to investigate strategies in these types of games is considered, and it is shown that different states are used by subjects to use partial effort strategies.

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Cooperation in Stochastic Games: A Prisoner's Dilemma Experiment

Cited by 2 publications

References 17 publications

Mutual monitoring in multi-period teams: an experimental investigation

Mutual monitoring in multi-period teams: an experimental investigation

An Experimental Study of Public Information in the Asymmetric Partnership Game

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