Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma Games

Beckenkamp, Martin; Hennig‐Schmidt, Heike; Maier-Rigaud, Frank P.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.968942

Cited by 34 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…More specifically, the asymmetric games were asymmetric combinations of the high and low endowment symmetric games (cf. Beckenkamp et al, ). As such, in the asymmetric games, the outcomes of one player were always twice as high as those of the other player.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Furthermore, although most prior research has examined PDGs with identical outcomes for both players, many social interactions are characterized by asymmetry in outcomes (for some examples, see Beckenkamp, Hennig-Schmidt, & Maier-Rigaud, 2007). Indeed, many real-life interactions entail different outcomes for each player.…”

Section: How Does the Payoff Structure Influence Choice Behavior?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Decision making in the prisoner's dilemma game: The effect of exit on cooperation and social welfare

Haesevoets

Bostyn

Folmer

et al. 2018

Behavioral Decision Making

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The prisoner's dilemma game is a mixed‐motive game that offers two players the simultaneous choice between a cooperative and a defective alternative. An often neglected aspect of such a binary‐choice game, however, is that in many real‐life encounters, people can choose not only to cooperate or defect, but they also have a third option: to exit the social dilemma. Although in the literature a consensus has emerged that the addition of an exit opportunity benefits cooperation, there is only scant research into its effect on social welfare. In order to allow a direct comparison of cooperation rates and welfare levels across binary‐choice and trinary‐choice games, in this study, we used a design in which the same participants played similar games with and without an exit option (i.e., a within‐subjects design), and this in a range of structural variations. The findings of our study indicated that the aggregated outcome of both players is generally lower in games with an exit option than in games without an exit option. Moreover, our results showed that the efficiency of the exit option strongly depends on the specific outcome structure of the game (in terms of its endowment size, (a)symmetry, and level of noncorrespondence). In the discussion, it is argued that the implementation of an exit option as a strategy to increase social welfare should be critically assessed.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: How Does the Payoff Structure Influence Choice Behavior?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Decision making in the prisoner's dilemma game: The effect of exit on cooperation and social welfare

Haesevoets

Bostyn

Folmer

et al. 2018

Behavioral Decision Making

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In the present study, we have included three situational dimensions: asymmetry in outcomes, endowment size, and level of non‐correspondence. We included these particular dimensions because each of them is expected to differently affect the underlying conflict between self and others (and as such, the amount of cooperation) and because these dimensions also reflect prevalent differences in real‐world mixed‐motive situations (see Beckenkamp et al, ; Rapoport & Chammah, ; Schopler et al, , for examples).…”

Section: Consistency In Choice Behaviour In Mixed‐motive Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As such, asymmetric games are expected to appeal more strongly to motives related to inequality (and the avoidance thereof) and are therefore expected to be associated with lower cooperation. While the number of studies into the effect of asymmetry is limited, their findings indeed suggest that asymmetric games produce less cooperation than symmetric ones (see Beckenkamp et al, ; Croson, ; Lave, ; Sheposh & Gallo, ).…”

Section: Consistency In Choice Behaviour In Mixed‐motive Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Behavioural Consistency within the Prisoner'S Dilemma Game: The Role of Personality and Situation

Haesevoets

Folmer

Bostyn³

et al. 2018

Eur J Pers

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Mixed‐motive games represent situations that confront people with a conflict between cooperative and non‐cooperative alternatives. Despite this common basis, recent research has shown that the consistency of people's choices across different mixed‐motive games is rather low. The present research examined behavioural consistency within the same mixed‐motive game, by presenting participants with a series of one‐shot Prisoner's Dilemma Games. Across this set of games, payoffs were manipulated in order to intensify or weaken the conflict between self and the other party while maintaining the game's underlying structure. Our findings indicate that significant differences in choice behaviour are observed as a function of both situational (i.e. manipulations of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game's payoff structure) and personality differences (i.e. individual differences in personality and motivational traits). Moreover, our included situational variables and personality features did not interact with each other and were about equally impactful in shaping cooperation. Crucially, however, despite the significant behavioural differences across game variants, considerable consistency in choices was found as well, which suggests that the game's motivational basis reliably impacts choice behaviour in spite of situational and personality variations. We discuss implications for theorizing on mixed‐motive situations and elaborate on the question how cooperation can be promoted. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology

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“…10 See Holt (1995) for an overview, or, for instance, the classic theoretical paper by Selten (1973) and experimental follow-up studies by Huck et al (2004) analyzing the role the number of firms plays for sustaining collusion. See also Beckenkamp et al (2007), Engel (2007), and the comprehensive overview by Engel (2006). If one wants to derive economic criteria to detect collusion, a relevant insight is that tacit and explicit collusion rest on the same economic principles.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Triggering Inspections Ex Officio: Moving Beyond a Passive Eu Cartel Policy

Friederiszick

Maier-Rigaud

2007

Journal of Competition Law and Economics

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The implementation of leniency programs is considered a success both at a EU Community level and in individual member states. The paper discusses the value of ex officio investigations for cartel detection in light of leniency and complaint-based cases. Are ex officio investigations still needed? Should a competition authority concentrate its scarce resources exclusively on the prosecution of leniency or complaint-based cases or follow a proactive market monitoring policy? It is argued that investigations triggered ex officio are an important complementary enforcement tool to the other passive instruments available to a competition authority. A bottom-up methodology for triggering inspections based on economic criteria is presented allowing for a more proactive cartel policy.

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Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma Games

Cited by 34 publications

References 37 publications

Decision making in the prisoner's dilemma game: The effect of exit on cooperation and social welfare

Decision making in the prisoner's dilemma game: The effect of exit on cooperation and social welfare

Behavioural Consistency within the Prisoner'S Dilemma Game: The Role of Personality and Situation

Triggering Inspections Ex Officio: Moving Beyond a Passive Eu Cartel Policy

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