2007
DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhm024
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Triggering Inspections Ex Officio: Moving Beyond a Passive Eu Cartel Policy

Abstract: The implementation of leniency programs is considered a success both at a EU Community level and in individual member states. The paper discusses the value of ex officio investigations for cartel detection in light of leniency and complaint-based cases. Are ex officio investigations still needed? Should a competition authority concentrate its scarce resources exclusively on the prosecution of leniency or complaint-based cases or follow a proactive market monitoring policy? It is argued that investigations trig… Show more

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Cited by 22 publications
(6 citation statements)
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References 27 publications
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“…2 Asymmetry plays an important role in various areas spanning from, for instance, competition policy questions surrounding collective dominance or cartel stability issues (see Friederiszick and Maier-Rigaud (2007)) to governance questions surrounding collective action problems and the management of common-pool resources (see Ostrom (1990)). …”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…2 Asymmetry plays an important role in various areas spanning from, for instance, competition policy questions surrounding collective dominance or cartel stability issues (see Friederiszick and Maier-Rigaud (2007)) to governance questions surrounding collective action problems and the management of common-pool resources (see Ostrom (1990)). …”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is open to question whether a Cartel Directorate consisting of only approximately 60 staff is really sufficient for the Commission to tackle the 50 cartels now on its books." Furthermore, the impact of a leniency program on enforcement through other means is a concern emphasized in Friederiszick and Maier-Rigaud (2008). Both authors were members of DG Comp, and their paper recommends that the DG Comp increase nonleniency enforcement methods such as being active in detecting cartels.…”
Section: Leniency Programs and Increased Cartel Ratementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Ради постизања тих циљева, Комисија ће се позивати на вредност прихода од продаје робе или услуга на које се односи повреда као темељ за утврђивање казне. Такође, трајање повреде треба да има значајну улогу у утврђивању висине примерене казне, па се стога сматра важним да казна одражава и број година током којих је предузеће учествовало у повреди 8 . Због тога се комбинација вредности прихода од продаје на коју се односи повреда, као и трајање те повреде, сматра примереном формулом која одражава економску важност повреде, али и релативну тежину сваког предузећа у повреди.…”
Section: начин за утврђивање новчаних казни од стране комисије у случају картелаunclassified