Cooperation Incentives in 4G Networks

Review and analysis of networking challenges in cloud computing

“…An obvious method for efficiently using the available cloud resources is to persuade cloud participants to cooperate among themselves. This cooperation can be enforced in several ways: through a common goal (Huerta-Canepa and Lee 2010), using monetary incentives (Charilas, et al 2011), social incentives (Tanase and Cristea 2011) or reputation incentives (Hwang, Shin and Yoon 2008) (Charilas, et al 2011). The major problem associated with the common goal method (Huerta-Canepa and Lee 2010) is that it does not work in the absence of a common activity among the potential collaborating entities.…”

“…The major problem associated with the common goal method (Huerta-Canepa and Lee 2010) is that it does not work in the absence of a common activity among the potential collaborating entities. In the case of monetary incentive (Charilas, et al 2011), several issues need to be addressed to identify the most suitable cloud business model to be used (Sen, et al 2013), and investigate more specific problems such as the credit representation; the security requirements to guarantee a safe monetary transaction; what price to use for each cloud resource; and what type of tariff should be selected (e.g. static, dynamic).…”

Game Theory for Collaboration in Future Networks

“…On the other hand, the reputation-based solutions typically aim to establish long-term relationships among nodes. This section will be highlighting some relevant work from these two groups (Charilas, 2011), which is summarized in Figure 3. The first group of contributions makes use of virtual payments for channel use and to incentive the collaboration among nodes in a multi-hop wireless network topology, as shown in Figure 4.…”

“…For example, these approaches could help to choose the cheapest route between a source and a destination node either by minimizing the total number of hops (to minimize the end-to-end flow delay) or by choosing the less-congested hops (to increase the end-to-end flow data rate). The drawbacks of credit-based proposals are additional overhead and complexity to charge users fairly and avoid cheating, turning these proposals hard to deploy (Charilas, 2011). In FNs, customers can be billed using a congestion-sensitive tariff, where prices are set in real time according to current load and taking full advantage of demand elasticity to maximize efficiency and fairness (Saraydar, 2002).…”

“…Some potential problems are the usage of additional bandwidth and battery energy to intensively monitor the behavior of each network node. In addition, some nodes could collude to cheat the reputation of other nodes by the dissemination of false information through the network about the latter nodes to the former nodes increase their benefits (Charilas, 2011). The development of more suitable and fair schemes to incentivize cooperation in FNs is a challenging research direction.…”