Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment

Cinyabuguma, Matthias; Page, Talbot; Putterman, Louis

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.011

Cited by 259 publications

(121 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…Evidently, this substrategy can be interpreted also as a means of reducing the relative cost of losing -losing is bad for the individual's reproductive success, but ostracism is worse (O'Connor 2000; Richerson and Boyd 2005). The threat of ostracism, incidentally, has consistently been shown to increase cooperation to the maximum level in economic games (Cinyabuguma et al 2005). For low status individuals, getting no attention at all may be worse than getting negative attention.…”

Section: Everyone's a Winnermentioning

confidence: 99%

Mating games: cultural evolution and sexual selection

Block

Dewitte²

2006

Biol Philos

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Abstract. In this paper, we argue that mating games, a concept that denotes cultural practices characterized by a competitive element and an ornamental character, are essential drivers behind the emergence and maintenance of human cultural practices. In order to substantiate this claim, we sketch out the essential role of the game's players and audience, as well as the ways in which games can mature and turn into relatively stable cultural practices. After outlining the life phase of mating games -their emergence, rise, maturation, and possible eventual decline -we go on to argue that participation in these games (in each phase) does make sense from an adaptationist point of view. The strong version of our theory which proposes that all cultural practices are, or once were, mating games, allows us to derive a set of testable predictions for the fields of archaeology, economics, and psychology.

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Section: Everyone's a Winnermentioning

confidence: 99%

Mating games: cultural evolution and sexual selection

Block

Dewitte²

2006

Biol Philos

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“…The latter represent norm enforcing sanctions which are well studied in experimental economics (Falk et al, 2005;Cinyabuguma et al, 2005). However, little is know about the pattern of social sanctions outside of the lab.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Survey evidence on conditional norm enforcement

Traxler

Winter

2012

European Journal of Political Economy

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We discuss survey evidence on individuals' willingness to sanction norm violationssuch as evading taxes, drunk driving, fare dodging, or skiving off work -by expressing disapproval or social exclusion. Our data suggest that people condition their sanctioning behavior on their belief about the frequency of norm violations. The more commonly a norm violation is believed to occur, the lower the individuals' inclination to punish it.Based on an instrumental variable approach, we demonstrate that this pattern reflects a causal relationship.

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“…We observe three types of length of reversible exclusion. In some studies, exclusion is irreversible (Cinyabuguma et al, 2005; Maier-Rigaud et al, 2010; Akpalu and Martinsson, 2011). An excluded subject remains ostracized until the end of the session.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Exclusion and Reintegration in a Social Dilemma

Soldà

Villeval

2017

SSRN Journal

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Abstract:Using a social dilemma game, we study the cooperative behavior of individuals who reintegrate their group after being excluded by their peers. We manipulate the length of exclusion and whether this length is imposed exogenously or results from a vote. We show that people are willing to exclude the least cooperators and they punish more, and more severely, chronic defections. In return, a longer exclusion has a higher disciplining effect on cooperation after reintegration, but only when the length of exclusion is not chosen by group members. Its relative disciplining effect is smaller when the length of exclusion results from a vote. In this environment, a quicker reintegration also limits retaliation. The difference in the impact of long vs. short exclusion on retaliation is larger when the length of exclusion is chosen by group members than when it is exogenous. Post-reintegration cooperation and forgiveness depend not only on the length of exclusion but also on the perceived intentions of others when they punish. Keywords:Ostracism, exclusion, reintegration, cooperation, experiment JEL codes:C92, H41, D23 Exclusion and Reintegration in a Social DilemmaAlice Solda and Marie Claire Villeval April 24, 2018 AbstractUsing a social dilemma game, we study the cooperative behavior of individuals who reintegrate their group after being excluded by their peers. We manipulate the length of exclusion and whether this length is imposed exogenously or results from a vote. We show that people are willing to exclude the least cooperators and they punish more, and more severely, chronic defections. In return, a longer exclusion has a higher disciplining effect on cooperation after reintegration, but only when the length of exclusion is not chosen by group members. Its relative disciplining effect is smaller when the length of exclusion results from a vote. In this environment, a quicker reintegration also limits retaliation. The difference in the impact of long vs. short exclusion on retaliation is larger when the length of exclusion is chosen by group members than when it is exogenous. Post-reintegration cooperation and forgiveness depend not only on the length of exclusion but also on the perceived intentions of others when they punish. JEL-Code: C92, H41, D23

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Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment

Cited by 259 publications

References 31 publications

Mating games: cultural evolution and sexual selection

Mating games: cultural evolution and sexual selection

Survey evidence on conditional norm enforcement

Exclusion and Reintegration in a Social Dilemma

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