Cooperation with Externalities and Uncertainty

Habis, Helga; Csercsik, Dávid

doi:10.1007/s11067-014-9265-3

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 29 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Since vertical cooperation in supply chains has been the focus of various research efforts over the last decades (e.g. Holguín-Veras et al 2008;Unnikrishnan et al 2009;Holguín-Veras et al 2011;Habis and Csercsik 2015), this paper extends the knowledge field on horizontal logistics cooperation. Horizontal logistics cooperation may be defined as collaboration between two or more firms that are active at the same level of the supply chain and perform comparable logistics functions (Cruijssen et al 2007c).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysing the Effect of Partner Characteristics on the Performance of Horizontal Carrier Collaborations

et al. 2018

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In order to survive under the ever increasing pressure to operate more efficiently, transportation companies are obliged to adopt a collaborative focus. Although organisations become increasingly aware of the inevitable character of horizontal collaboration, surveys report failure rates up to 70 percent for starting strategic partnerships. While a growing body of research acknowledges the importance of fit between partners for coalition sustainability, no extensive study has been performed on the numerical relationship between specific company traits and the performance of the alliances these organisations are involved in. This paper empirically investigates the impact of coalition characteristics on attainable collaborative savings in a joint route planning context. Factorial analysis of variance is applied to examine desirable coalition structures for horizontal carrier collaborations based on request sharing. Overall, our experiments suggest that carriers may reap significant operational benefits from sharing orders. However, the extent of these benefits highly depends on the characteristics of the partnering organisations, stressing the importance of careful partner selection.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysing the Effect of Partner Characteristics on the Performance of Horizontal Carrier Collaborations

et al. 2018

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Here we use the concept of the minimal claim function defined by Habis and Csercsik (2014) to derive the characteristic function. The basic concept of the minimal claim function is that each coalition's minimal claim is equal to the value the coalition gets when the rest of the players form a partition that is stable in the spirit of the recursive core (Kóczy, 2007) 7 .…”

Section: Analysis Of Pff Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modeling transfer profits as externalities in a cooperative game-theoretic model of natural gas networks

et al. 2019

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Existing cooperative game theoretic studies of bargaining power in gas pipeline systems are based on the so called characteristic function form (CFF). This approach is potentially misleading if some pipelines fall under regulated third party access (TPA). TPA, which is by now the norm in the EU, obliges the owner of a pipeline to transport gas for others, provided they pay a regulated transport fee. From a game theoretic perspective, this institutional setting creates so called "externalities," the description of which requires partition function form (PFF) games. In this paper we propose a method to compute payoffs, reflecting the power structure, for a pipeline system with regulated TPA. The method is based on an iterative flow mechanism to determine gas flows and transport fees for individual players and uses the recursive core and the minimal claim function to convert the PPF game back into a CFF game, which can be solved by standard methods. We illustrate the approach with a simple stylized numerical example of the gas network in Central Eastern Europe with a focus on Ukraine's 1 power index as a major transit country.

show abstract

“…Bossert et al (2005) look at games where the uncertainty is about the choice between two TU games and correspondingly the uncertainty about the value of a coalition corresponds to the uncertainty about the game played. More recently Habis and Herings (2011); Habis and Csercsik (2015) introduces uncertainty in the dynamic model of initiated by Koutsougeras (1998) now characterised by the weak-and strong sequential cores (Predtetchinski et al, 2002;Predtetchinski, 2007;Habis and Herings, 2010). At last, Kóczy (2002) and Konishi and Ray (2003) consider dynamic coalitional games with foresighted players.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%