Cooperative and Non-cooperative WSPs in Dynamic Spectrum Leasing

ACM Trans. Internet Technol.

2014

We introduce a private commons model that consists of network providers who serve a fixed primary demand and strategically price to improve their revenues from an additional secondary demand. For general forms of secondary demand, we establish the existence and uniqueness of two characteristic prices: the break-even price and the market sharing price. We show that the market sharing price is always greater than the break-even price, leading to a price interval in which a provider is both profitable and willing to share the demand. Making use of this result, we give insight into the nature of market outcomes. ACM Reference Format:Emir Kavurmacioglu, Murat Alanyali, and David Starobinski. 2014. Demand-invariant price relationships and market outcomes in competitive private commons.

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Demand-Invariant Price Relationships and Market Outcomes in Competitive Private Commons

ACM Trans. Internet Technol.

2014

“…In our model, we assume that providers offer the same type of services and therefore cannot influence the secondary users' preferences beside the price advertised. A related work by Ren et al [35] studies and compare the market outcome achieved by respectively enforcing cooperation or competition among providers. While such external interventions might be useful in analyzing hypothetical outcomes, our model refrains from such enforcements as it aims to characterize a natural competition.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competition in Private Commons: Price War or Market Sharing?

IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking

2016

Abstract-This paper characterizes the outcomes of secondary spectrum markets when multiple providers compete for secondary demand. We study a competition model in which each provider aims to enhance its revenue by opportunistically serving a price dependent secondary demand, while also serving dedicated primary demand. We consider two methodologies for sharing spectrum between primary and secondary demand: In coordinated access, spectrum providers have the option to decline a secondary access request if that helps enhance their revenue. We explicitly characterize a break-even price such that profitability of secondary access provision is guaranteed if secondary access is priced above the break-even price, regardless of the volume of secondary demand. Consequently, we establish that competition among providers that employ optimal coordinated access leads to a price war, as a result of which the provider with the lowest break-even price captures the entire market. This result holds for arbitrary secondary demand functions. In uncoordinated access, primary and secondary users share spectrum on equal basis, akin to ISM bands. Under this policy, we characterize a market sharing price which determines a provider's willingness to share the market. We show an instance where the market sharing price is strictly greater than the break-even price, indicating that market equilibrium in an uncoordinated access setting can be fundamentally different as it opens up the possibility of providers sharing the market at higher prices.

“…For instance, in the works by Jagannathan [16], Kasbekar [19], Duan [12], Ren [35], Niyato and Hossain [31], Sengupta and Chatterjee [37] and Xing [40], game theoretic approaches to spectrum auctioning and leasing are analyzed. The set-up of all these papers (i.e., competition between providers to lease spectrum) is different from ours (i.e., competition between providers to lure users).…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competition in secondary spectrum markets: Price war or market sharing?

2012 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks

2012

Abstract-Recent initiatives allow cellular providers to offer spot service of their licensed spectrum, paving the way to dynamic secondary spectrum markets. This paper characterizes market outcomes when multiple providers are drawn into competition for secondary demand. We study a game-theoretic model in which each provider aims to enhance its revenue by opportunistically serving secondary demand, while also serving dedicated primary demand. The secondary demand is a function of the price being charged. We consider two philosophies for sharing spectrum between primary and secondary demand: In coordinated access, spectrum providers have the option to decline a secondary access request if that helps enhance their revenue. We explicitly characterize a break-even price such that profitability of secondary access provision is guaranteed if secondary access is priced above the breakeven price, regardless of the volume of secondary demand. Consequently, we establish that competition among providers that employ coordinated access leads to a price war. In particular market sharing above the break-even price is not an equilibrium outcome. This conclusion is valid for arbitrary secondary-demand functions. While the demand function does not play a part in determining the winner, it does affect the price of secondary access as exercised by the winning provider. In uncoordinated access, primary and secondary users share spectrum on equal basis, akin to the sharing modality of ISM bands. We demonstrate that market equilibrium in an uncoordinated access setting can be fundamentally different as it opens up the possibility of providers sharing the market at higher prices.