Competition in Private Commons: Price War or Market Sharing?

Abstract

Abstract-This paper characterizes the outcomes of secondary spectrum markets when multiple providers compete for secondary demand. We study a competition model in which each provider aims to enhance its revenue by opportunistically serving a price dependent secondary demand, while also serving dedicated primary demand. We consider two methodologies for sharing spectrum between primary and secondary demand: In coordinated access, spectrum providers have the option to decline a secondary access request if that helps enhance their revenue. We explicitly characterize a break-even price such that profitability of secondary access provision is guaranteed if secondary access is priced above the break-even price, regardless of the volume of secondary demand. Consequently, we establish that competition among providers that employ optimal coordinated access leads to a price war, as a result of which the provider with the lowest break-even price captures the entire market. This result holds for arbitrary secondary demand functions. In uncoordinated access, primary and secondary users share spectrum on equal basis, akin to ISM bands. Under this policy, we characterize a market sharing price which determines a provider's willingness to share the market. We show an instance where the market sharing price is strictly greater than the break-even price, indicating that market equilibrium in an uncoordinated access setting can be fundamentally different as it opens up the possibility of providers sharing the market at higher prices.

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Abandoned-Bike-Sharing Recycling: Impact of Recycling Subsidy Policy

“…At present, bike-sharing-related research focuses on five aspects: economic value analysis [1], environmental benefit analysis [28,29], industry impact factor analysis [30][31][32][33][34][35], market mechanism analysis [12,[36][37][38][39], and industry management [13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26]40], which provide a theoretical basis for further research on the bike-sharing industry from multiple levels, but still lack a systematic and dynamic research approach.…”

“…Most polluting companies tend to avoid the NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) campaign caused by pollution [47], while local governments need to fulfill their commitments and gain the advocacy of residents [48]. Meanwhile, the competition for market share among bike-sharing companies with the same price but different service qualities is also a non-negligible influencing factor, which is a hot research topic in the sharing economy [36][37][38][39]. The reason is that during the seven years of development of China's bike-sharing industry, its market model has gradually evolved from one that follows Anglo-Saxon capitalism to one that follows Rhineland capitalism.…”

E-commerce Price War Based on Game Theory

“…Market share is the proportion of sales a company occupies in the industry, indicating its competitive position [5]. The increase of market share means the increase of sales volume so that firms can make more profits.…”

A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Shared/Buy-in Computing Systems

“…Game-theoretic approaches have been adopted widely in areas that involve users' strategic interaction, such as internetworking [12], wireless networks [13], shared spectrum access [14], cybersecurity [15], distributed computing [16], cloud co-location services [17], and advanced reservations [18]. The main goal in those studies has been to find the Nash equilibrium of the respective games.…”